Acquittal stands where the trial court’s reasonable view is supported by cumulative evidentiary doubts.

On 3 October 2002, Krishna Kumar Singh, an advocate, was allegedly shot near the Sipara Overbridge while proceeding towards the Court with Sandeep Kumar Singh, Vishal Kumar, Surendra Singh and his clerk.

The prosecution alleged that Lal Bihari Prasad, Ashok Singh, Sanjay Singh and other assailants surrounded and fired at him, resulting in his death at PMCH; firing was also allegedly directed at the accompanying persons, though none was injured.

On the basis of the informant’s fardbeyan, Phulwarisharif P.S. Case No. 412 of 2002 was registered under Sections 302 and 307 of the IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act.

After investigation, charge-sheet and trial, the prosecution examined ten witnesses and the defence examined one witness.

The Additional Sessions Judge XIV, Patna acquitted the respondents by judgment dated 23 December 2024, finding that the alleged eyewitnesses were unreliable, the place and manner of occurrence were doubtful, the fardbeyan was not satisfactorily proved, and material witnesses were not examined.

The State preferred the present appeal under Section 419(1) and (3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.

Whether the trial court’s judgment acquitting the respondents for offences under Sections 302 and 307 of the IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act was perverse or otherwise required interference by the appellate court?

Whether the prosecution had established, beyond reasonable doubt, the place and manner of occurrence, the presence and credibility of the alleged eyewitnesses, and the specific participation of each respondent?

Whether, in an appeal against acquittal, the appellate court should interfere where the view taken by the trial court is a possible and reasonable view of the evidence?

The Court applied Sections 302 and 307 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 27 of the Arms Act, which require reliable proof of the accused’s participation in murder, attempt to murder and use of a prohibited firearm, respectively.

It relied on Syed Ibrahim v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2006) 10 SCC 601, for the principle that failure to establish the place of occurrence may fundamentally undermine the prosecution case.

It applied the rule in Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (1973) 2 SCC 808, that where two reasonable views are possible, the view favourable to the accused must be adopted and reasonable doubt must enure to the accused.

It further relied on Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415, holding that although an appellate court may reappreciate evidence in an appeal against acquittal, the acquittal carries a strengthened or double presumption of innocence, and interference is unwarranted where the trial court’s view is a reasonable one.

The Court found that the prosecution evidence suffered from cumulative and material deficiencies.

PW1 to PW5 were hearsay witnesses, while the alleged eyewitnesses, PW6 to PW8, gave inconsistent accounts concerning the route, accompaniment and subsequent conduct, making their presence doubtful.

The place of occurrence was not satisfactorily established because, despite the alleged firing and bleeding, no blood, pellet or other incriminating material was recovered from the asserted spot; blood-stained soil was collected from another location, and the relevant auto, police vehicle and police personnel were not properly established or examined.

The fardbeyan allegedly recorded at PMCH was received by the Investigating Officer several hours later, its recording officer was not examined, and its authorship was not adequately proved.

The ocular version also lacked satisfactory medical and forensic corroboration, including inconsistencies regarding the direction and number of shots and the non-seizure of allegedly blood-stained clothing.

The non-examination of the advocate’s clerk, auto-driver, recording officer and police personnel further weakened the prosecution case.

In particular, Sanjay Singh was not named in the fardbeyan, no specific overt act was attributed to him, and his alleged involvement emerged only through later testimony.

Applying the principles governing reasonable doubt and appellate restraint, the Court held that the trial court’s view was a possible and reasonable assessment of the evidence, not a perverse or record-defying conclusion.

Since the trial court’s acquittal was a reasonable view supported by the evidentiary deficiencies, no appellate interference was justified under the principles in Chandrappa.

The appeal was consequently dismissed at the admission stage, and any pending applications were also disposed of.