Acquittal Upheld Where Alleged Electricity Theft Was Not Substantiated by Seizure or Proof of Ownership

The appellant (complainant/Electricity Company) challenged the judgment dated 19.10.2022 passed by the Special Judge (Electricity Act), Bijawar, which acquitted the respondent of charges under Section 135 of the Electricity Act, 2003.

The prosecution alleged that on 23.12.2014, departmental officers found the respondent using electricity illegally via a direct connection to an L.T. line to power two bulbs and a flour mill.

A Panchnama was prepared (Ex. P/1), but no materials were seized due to the accused's alleged resistance.

The respondent pleaded false implication, and the Trial Court acquitted him on the grounds that the prosecution failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt.

1. Whether the prosecution provided sufficient evidence to establish the identity and ownership of the premises where the alleged theft occurred.

2. Whether the testimonies of the departmental witnesses (PW-1 to PW-4), in the absence of independent witnesses and physical seizure, were sufficient to overturn the acquittal.

3. Whether the findings of the Trial Court were perverse, illegal, or required appellate interference.

The court primarily applied Section 135 of the Electricity Act, 2003, relating to the theft of electricity.

It relied on Section 378(4) of the Cr.P.C. regarding appeals against acquittal.

The court invoked the principle from State of Gujarat v. Jayrajbhai Punjabhai Varu (2016) and Nikhil Chandra Mondal v. State of W.B. (2023), establishing that if two views are possible, the one favorable to the accused must prevail, and suspicion cannot replace proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Furthermore, it applied the summary of principles for acquittal appeals from Mallappa & others v. State of Karnataka (2024), which mandates that appellate courts must demonstrate perversity or illegality in the Trial Court’s decision to justify reversal.

The Court observed that the prosecution’s case rested entirely on departmental witnesses (PW-1 to PW-4) whose testimonies lacked independent corroboration.

Significant procedural lapses were noted: first, no physical evidence (wires or appliances) was seized from the spot, and the explanation for this—alleged resistance—was missing from the Panchnama (Ex. P/1).

Second, there were contradictions and gaps in the testimony; for instance, PW-1’s signature was missing from the Panchnama, and witnesses could not recall basic details such as the color of the wire used or the date of disconnection.

Crucially, the prosecution failed to produce any documentary evidence proving the accused’s ownership or possession of the house in question.

Applying the Mallappa standards, the Court found the Trial Court’s view to be a "legally plausible view".

The Court held that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and that the favorable view toward the accused's innocence was correctly adopted by the lower court.

The appeal was dismissed, and the judgment of acquittal was affirmed.