Acquittal Upheld Where Material Contradictions and Lack of Independent Corroboration Render Prosecutrix's Testimony Unreliable

The State appealed against the acquittal of the respondent, Mahesh Nagle, by the XVIII Additional Sessions Judge/Special Judge (POCSO), Bhopal.

The prosecution alleged that on 14.03.2020, the respondent approached the minor prosecutrix at her home and threatened her with death/suicide if she did not speak to him.

The FIR also contained allegations of prior stalking and an incident in a park where the respondent forcibly held the prosecutrix's hand for a photograph.

The trial court acquitted the respondent of charges under Sections 354, 354-D, 506-II of the IPC and Sections 7/8 of the POCSO Act, citing material contradictions and a lack of credible evidence.

1. Whether the trial court's judgment of acquittal was perverse or based on a misreading of evidence.

2. Whether the prosecution proved the incidents of molestation and stalking beyond reasonable doubt despite the absence of independent witnesses and material discrepancies in testimony.

The Court applied Sections 354 (outraging modesty), 354-D (stalking), and 506-II (criminal intimidation) of the IPC, alongside Sections 7/8 of the POCSO Act.

It relied on the appellate standards for acquittal set in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka (2023), which dictates that an appellate court must not overturn an acquittal if the trial court’s view is a "possible view".

It further followed Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka (2024) and Mallappa v. State of Karnataka (2024), emphasizing that interference is only warranted in cases of patent perversity or error of law.

The High Court observed that while the prosecutrix was established as a minor, her testimony and those of her parents (PW-2 and PW-4) contained significant exaggerations and omissions.

Critically, the court noted that the FIR only alleged a threat on the date of the incident (14.03.2020), making the charges under Section 354 IPC and POCSO Act for that specific date erroneous.

The court found it fatal to the prosecution that the prosecutrix admitted she only knew the accused by face and not by name, yet his name appeared in the FIR without explanation.

Furthermore, the sole independent eye-witness (Deepali) was not examined.

The court determined that the trial court’s decision to grant the benefit of doubt was a legally plausible view based on the "trivial nature of variations" and the "unworthy of credence" nature of the evidence.

The application for leave to appeal (I.A. No. 20206/2022) was dismissed, and consequently, the criminal appeal was dismissed. The acquittal of the respondent stands.