Acquittal Upheld Where Prosecution Fails to Establish Accused’s Title, Possession, or Identity as Electricity Consumer

On February 6, 2016, an inspection team led by the Investigating Officer conducted a surprise check at a residential premise in District Satna and alleged that the respondent was dishonestly consuming 490 watts of electricity via a direct bypass to the power line.

A complaint was filed under Sections 135 and 138 of the Electricity Act, 2003 on July 2, 2016.

The prosecution examined three witnesses, while the accused testified as DW-1, claiming innocence.

The Trial Court acquitted the respondent on November 15, 2022, citing a lack of independent witnesses, failure to prove ownership of the premises, and non-seizure of the offending equipment.

The appellant challenged this acquittal in the High Court.

1. Whether the Trial Court’s judgment of acquittal was perverse or based on a misreading of evidence regarding the identity of the user and the ownership of the premises.

2. Whether the appellate court should interfere with an acquittal when the view taken by the Trial Court is a "plausible view" based on the record.

Section 135 (theft of electricity) and Section 138 (interference with meters) of the Electricity Act, 2003.

Section 378 of the CrPC regarding appeals against acquittal.

The principle from H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka (2023), which dictates that an appellate court should not overturn an acquittal if the Trial Court’s view is possible, even if a contrary view exists.

Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka (2024) and Mallappa v. State of Karnataka (2024), emphasizing the "presumption of innocence" and the requirement of "patent perversity" for reversal.

The High Court found that the prosecution failed to establish a direct link between the accused and the alleged theft as Witness Jitesh Prajapati (PW-1) admitted that the electricity connection was registered in the name of Madan Mohan Singh (or Man Mohan Singh), not the accused.

The prosecution provided no evidence that the accused was the owner or the sole representative of the consumer.

No memorandum was prepared regarding the accused's refusal to sign documents, and no independent witnesses were joined despite the inspection occurring in a residential area.

The prosecution failed to seize the wire or equipment used for the theft, and the "dispute" cited as an excuse for this failure remained unclarified.

Since the Trial Court’s findings were grounded in these material evidentiary gaps, the acquittal was a "plausible view" that did not warrant interference.

The Court concluded that there was no "patent perversity" or error of law in the Trial Court's decision.

The High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the judgment of acquittal.