Acquittal upheld where testimony contained material contradictions and failed to prove caste-based intent for atrocity offences.

The complainant, Jagdishbhai, and his uncle Karshanbhai (PW-2) had a dispute on 16.06.2007 with Accused No. 3 regarding the rent of a miller machine.

It was alleged that on 17.06.2007, the ten accused arrived in two vehicles at the village gate, assaulted the complainant with fist blows, and used caste-based slurs.

A complaint was filed on 18.06.2007 under Sections 147, 148, 149, 504, 323, 506(2) of the IPC, Section 3(1)(10) of the SC/ST Act, and Section 135 of the Bombay Police Act.

The trial court (Fast Track Court No. 3, Mehsana) acquitted all accused on 30.04.2008, holding that the prosecution failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt.

The State appealed this acquittal.

Whether the prosecution established the guilt of the accused for assault and criminal intimidation beyond reasonable doubt despite material contradictions in witness testimonies.

Whether the alleged verbal abuse constituted an offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act in light of the intent and context of the dispute.

Whether there are "substantial and compelling reasons" for the appellate court to interfere with the trial court's order of acquittal.

The court applied Section 378 of the CrPC regarding appeals against acquittal, emphasizing the "double presumption of innocence" in favor of the acquitted.

It relied on *Sajan Sakhariya v. State of Kerala* (2024), which held that every insult does not violate the SC/ST Act unless directed specifically because of the victim’s caste.

Regarding the standards for reversing an acquittal, the court cited *Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka* (2007).

The court cited *Ram Kumar v. State of Haryana* (1995).

The court cited *Constable 907 Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand* (2025), which mandate that an acquittal should only be disturbed if the judgment is "patently perverse" or based on a misreading of evidence.

The High Court found significant discrepancies in the testimonies of PW-2 (uncle) and PW-3 (relative), noting that their court depositions contained facts not mentioned in their original police statements, such as the specific details of the rent dispute and the presence of weapons.

The court observed that PW-4 (independent witness) did not see the assault but only saw vehicles leaving.

Medical evidence from PW-7 confirmed the injuries were superficial and could have been caused by a simple fall.

Furthermore, the prosecution failed to prove the recovery of the alleged weapons (pipe, knife, washing paddle) or that the insults were specifically caste-motivated rather than general heat-of-the-moment remarks arising from a commercial dispute.

The court determined that the trial court’s view was a "possible view" based on the evidence, and in the absence of perversity, the appellate court should not substitute its own opinion.

The court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and that there was no manifest illegality or perversity in the trial court's findings.

The double presumption of innocence remained unrebutted, and the trial court's evaluation of the evidence was found to be just and proper.