Acquittal upheld where the electricity-theft prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

On 3 June 2008, officers of the Gujarat Electricity Board conducted an inspection near the respondent’s paan shop, “Murlidhar,” at Village Nikava, Taluka Kalavad.

The inspection team allegedly found a direct connection from an electricity pole and seized cable and related apparatus.

A supplementary theft bill was prepared and served, but remained unpaid.

The Deputy Engineer thereafter lodged a complaint, registered as C.R. No. II-3212 of 2008, and the respondent was prosecuted under Section 135 of the Electricity Act, 2003.

The Trial Court examined the prosecution evidence and acquitted the respondent by judgment dated 22 October 2012 in Special (GEB) Case No. 42 of 2010.

The State preferred the present appeal under Section 378(1) and (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Whether the Trial Court committed any error of law or fact in acquitting the respondent of the charge under Section 135 of the Electricity Act, 2003.

Whether the prosecution established, beyond reasonable doubt, the respondent’s connection with the alleged theft of electricity through cogent and clinching evidence.

Whether the findings of the Trial Court were illegal, perverse, or otherwise warranted appellate interference in an appeal against acquittal.

The Court applied Section 135 of the Electricity Act, 2003, concerning theft of electricity, and Section 151, which governs cognizance of offences under the Act, including cognizance upon a complaint by an authorised person or upon a police report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

The Court also considered Section 50 of the Electricity Act and the requirements of proof connecting the accused with the alleged offence.

For appeals against acquittal, it relied on Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415; Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471; Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 8 SCC 149; and Ramesh v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 9 SCC 169, which establish that an appellate court may reappreciate evidence but must bear in mind the double presumption of innocence, and should not disturb an acquittal where two reasonable views are possible.

The Court also relied on Barot Vitthalbhai Damodardas v. Natwarbhai Umedbhai Patel, 2009 (3) GLR 1947, for the principle that criminal liability for electricity theft cannot be imposed merely on the basis of ownership or association with premises without material showing the accused’s actual involvement.

The Court found that the prosecution had not produced sufficient reliable evidence to establish that the respondent had committed or was responsible for the alleged electricity theft.

The investigating agency had not produced authorisation relied upon under Section 151, had not prepared a panchnama of the place of occurrence, and had neither collected nor produced the seized material before the Trial Court.

Documentary evidence further indicated that the premises stood in the name of the respondent’s father, while the prosecution failed to establish the respondent’s ownership, possession, or specific role in the alleged abstraction of electricity.

In light of these deficiencies, the evidence did not meet the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Applying the restrictive principles governing appellate interference with acquittals, the Court held that the Trial Court’s view was a reasonable one and was neither perverse nor legally infirm.

The appeal was dismissed, and the Trial Court’s judgment and order of acquittal dated 22 October 2012 were confirmed.

The respondent’s bail bond was cancelled, and the record and proceedings were directed to be returned to the concerned Trial Court.