Administrative Review of Sanction for Prosecution Without Fresh Material Constitutes Invalid Exercise of Statutory Power

The respondent (writ petitioner before the High Court), a doctor, was accused of demanding Rs.5,000–6,000 for knee surgery of the complainant's relative; payments of Rs.1,000 (24.03.2017), Rs.2,000 (25.03.2017), Rs.3,000 (27.03.2017), Rs.500, and Rs.2,000 (29.03.2017, post-surgery) were alleged, with the last sum recovered from a locked table drawer — broken open during a trap — at his official residence.

On 14.03.2018, the Joint Secretary, Department of Personnel (DoP), recommended against sanction, finding: the call transcripts showed no unequivocal demand (the 27.03.2017 conversation concerned the cost of steel plates, the patient being ineligible under a beneficial scheme); earlier payments were mere assertions; recovery from a locked drawer was highly suspicious; the positive handwash was explicable by the complainant handing over an X-ray film and shaking hands; news reports and video footage indicated a political party's publicity stunt; and the surgery was completed on 28.03.2017, rendering a bribe on 29.03.2017 suspect.

The Principal Secretary concurred and the Chief Secretary declined sanction.

On 24.05.2018, the Joint Secretary to the Chief Minister referred the matter back for reconsideration citing the drawer recovery and handwash, but placed no new material.

On reconsideration, the DoP reaffirmed its earlier view, and the Secretary again opined there was no ground for sanction, noting foul play in the trap could not be ruled out.

The Chief Secretary, expressing a "dilemma" — some aspects raising suspicion, others pointing to the respondent — opined that sanction "may be considered," and sanction was granted.

Challan No. 18/2019 dated 29.01.2019 was filed in Case No. 04/2019 before the Special Judge, ACD, Ajmer.

The respondent's writ petition was allowed by a Single Judge of the High Court, quashing the sanction as granted under undue coercion without anything new.

1. Whether a sanction for prosecution under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, granted upon reconsideration on the very same material after an earlier refusal, and without any fresh material, is legally sustainable.

2. Whether the sanctioning authority's decision was vitiated by extraneous considerations and political pressure emanating from the Chief Minister's office, evidencing non-application of mind.

3. Whether the requisite standard for grant of sanction — a possibility of establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, higher than mere preponderance of probabilities — was satisfied where the administrative authority itself harboured doubts.

Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, with Section 197 CrPC as the cognate provision.

Sanction is "a weapon to ensure discouragement of frivolous and vexatious prosecution and is a safeguard for the innocent but not a shield for the guilty," and the sanctioning authority must not act under pressure or external force.

Section 19/Section 197 CrPC contain no express provision for review or reconsideration once power is exercised, and a review prompted by the opinion of another department, without fresh material, is a decision on extraneous dictates vitiated by non-application of mind.

Sanction granted without application of mind or new materials after an earlier refusal where it is influenced by the Chief Minister's office is liable to be set aside.

While an administrative power of review may exist absent express statutory conferral, review of a refusal on the same material is impermissible, a mere change of opinion is no ground, and reconsideration is permissible only upon fresh materials with proper application of mind.

Where two views are possible, the view exonerating the officer must be taken; the sanctioning standard is a possibility of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt — "a tad higher than mere preponderance of probabilities but surely not to the extent of finding concrete proof beyond reasonable doubt."

The Court found the sequence on facts indistinguishable from Nishant Sareen: the Chief Secretary's initial refusal rested on a reasoned assessment, and the reconsideration was triggered solely by the CM's office without any new material, rendering the eventual grant a product of "extraneous dictates".

The DoP's reassessment — expressly not a verbatim reproduction — yielded an identical conclusion on full review, confirming the absence of any change in the evidentiary landscape.

The Chief Secretary's final opinion was ambivalent — "some aspects raise suspicion, some other aspects point a finger" — which the Court read as a dilemma born of pressure, remarking that the decision-making process "cannot resemble the dilemma in 'Hamlet's Soliloquy'" and that where ambivalence exists, extraneous considerations may be presumed; here "political dictate is blatantly displayed".

Applying the settled standard, the Court held that if the administrative authority itself entertains doubt and suspicion regarding demand, trap, and recovery, that is a "very reasonable and valid doubt" precluding sanction; here, even on preponderance of possibilities, a case of victimization arose.

The object of Section 19 — to protect public servants from harassment on false, frivolous, concocted and unsubstantiated allegations — squarely applied.

The State was directed to pay costs quantified at Rs.50,000 each for the proceedings before the High Court and the Supreme Court (Rs.1,00,000 total) within two months, failing which the respondent could file a Miscellaneous Application.