Administrative Tribunals lack inherent power to condone delay in Review Applications under Section 5 Limitation Act.

The Review Applicants (State of U.P. and Principal Chief Conservator of Forest) filed a review application along with a delay condonation application (MA No. 02 of 2026) seeking to review an order passed in OA No. 332/00027/2015.

The applicants argued that the Tribunal possesses the powers of a Civil Court and can condone delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, citing a circular from the Principal Bench and a High Court judgment in Surendra Kumar v. Union of India.

The primary matter for adjudication was whether the Tribunal has the statutory authority to condone delays in filing review applications.

1. Whether the Central Administrative Tribunal has the power to condone delay in filing a review application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

2. Whether the limitation period prescribed under Rule 17 of the CAT (Procedure) Rules, 1987 is mandatory or can be extended by the Tribunal.

The Tribunal applied Section 22 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, which grants the Tribunal certain powers of a Civil Court, including the power to review its decisions, but specifies that it is not bound by the Code of Civil Procedure.

Rule 17(1) of the Central Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1987, which stipulates that no review application shall be entertained unless filed within 30 days of receipt of the order.

The core governing precedent was the Supreme Court decision in The Property Company (P) Ltd. vs. Rohinten Daddy Mazda (2026), which established that quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals cannot resort to Section 5 of the Limitation Act to extend time unless such power is expressly indicated in their governing statute.

The Tribunal reasoned that while it possesses the power to review its decisions under Section 22(3)(f) of the Act, this power is subject to the specific limitation period set out in Rule 17 of the CAT (Procedure) Rules, 1987.

Citing the Supreme Court’s definitive ruling in The Property Company (P) Ltd., the Tribunal observed that unless a statute expressly empowers a quasi-judicial body to apply Section 5 of the Limitation Act, such power cannot be assumed or exercised through legal fiction.

The Tribunal noted that Rule 17 contains no such express provision for delay condonation.

The Bench held that the previous practice of condoning delay based on High Court rulings was superseded by the latest Supreme Court authority.

The Tribunal rejected the applicants' argument that the Principal Bench’s circular could override statutory rules or the Supreme Court's mandate.

Accordingly, the prayer for delay condonation (MA No. 02 of 2026) was rejected. As a logical consequence of the dismissal of the delay application, the Review Application was also rejected.