### Adoption Under Kangra Customary Law Divests the Adopted Son of Inheritance Rights to Natural Father's Estate

The plaintiff (Amar Nath) filed a suit for declaration and permanent prohibitory injunction against the defendant (Prakash Chand), asserting that although both were sons of Dullo, the defendant had been adopted by one Rupa as per local custom

The plaintiff claimed the defendant had lost all connection to his natural family and was thus not entitled to inherit Dullo’s estate

The defendant denied the adoption, asserting he only inherited Rupa's property via a Will due to service rendered

The Trial Court and First Appellate Court concurrently found that the defendant was the adopted son of Rupa and had no right to Dullo’s estate

The defendant appealed to the High Court on grounds of lack of evidence of ceremonies and bar of limitation

Kangra District Customary Law, specifically Questions 76 and 77, which establish that among Brahmins in Nurpur, no formal ceremonies are required for adoption and an adopted son is divested of the right to succeed to his natural father

Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act and the principle from Banwari Lal v. Trilok Chand, holding that statements in a Will regarding adoption are admissible

Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and the doctrine from Mst. Rukhmabai v. Lala Laxminarayan, which stipulates that the "right to sue" accrues only when there is a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe a right, rather than a mere adverse entry in revenue records

The Court found overwhelming documentary evidence of adoption, including a Will by Rupa describing the defendant as his adopted son, school records, and a previous appeal where the defendant himself claimed the status of an adopted son to inherit Rupa's estate

Under the specific customary law of Kangra, the absence of formal ceremonies did not vitiate the adoption

On the issue of limitation, the Court reasoned that the mere attestation of mutation in 1960 did not trigger the three-year period under Article 58

Since the plaintiff remained in possession and the defendant took no overt act to jeopardize that possession until shortly before the suit, the "right to sue" had not "first accrued" in 1960

The Court distinguished between a dormant adverse entry and an active threat to title

Furthermore, the suit was not barred by limitation because the cause of action arises from an actual threat to rights, not the mere existence of a wrong mutation entry

The High Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the concurrent findings of the lower courts. All decrees in favor of the plaintiff were maintained