Allahabad HC sets aside life sentences of two men found under 18 in 1980 murder case, sends punishment to Juvenile Board

The appeal arose from convictions and sentences imposed on eight accused for offences including Sections 302/149 and 307/149 IPC.

By the time of appeal, it survived only for appellants 5 and 6, Siraj Ahmad and Abdul Wahid.

During the appeal, they claimed juvenility on the date of the 28 September 1980 incident.

The High Court directed the Juvenile Justice Board to inquire into their ages; the Board accepted their educational records and reported their dates of birth as 25 November 1962 and 25 October 1962, respectively.

Counsel did not challenge the appellants’ convictions, but sought setting aside of their sentences and remittal to the Board.

Whether appellants 5 and 6 were juveniles on the date of the offence, having regard to the age-determination evidence.

Whether, notwithstanding the appellants’ juvenility, their convictions should stand while their sentences are set aside and the matter remitted to the Juvenile Justice Board for an appropriate order.

Section 7A of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 permits a claim of juvenility to be raised at any stage and requires an inquiry into age.

Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, and Rule 12(3) of the Juvenile Justice Rules, 2007, prescribe the hierarchy of age evidence, giving priority to qualifying educational or birth records over medical assessment.

Applying the principles discussed in Mumtaz v. State of U.P., including the treatment of pending proceedings under Section 20 of the 2000 Act, a court may maintain the finding of guilt but must refer a person found to have been a juvenile on the offence date to the Board for an appropriate order instead of imposing the ordinary criminal sentence.

The Court further relied on Jitendra Singh v. State of U.P. regarding the appropriate order under the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986, including the possibility of a fine in cases where other rehabilitative measures are no longer practicable.

The Board found the appellants’ school and examination records genuine, and the prosecution produced no witness to substantiate its objections to Siraj Ahmad’s records.

The High Court accepted the Board’s findings and calculated the appellants’ ages on the date of the incident as 17 years, 10 months and 3 days, and 17 years, 11 months and 3 days, respectively; both were therefore juveniles.

The Court nevertheless upheld the convictions, noting that the injured eyewitnesses’ testimony was corroborated by the medical evidence and disclosed no material contradiction; it found no perversity or illegality in the trial court’s judgment.

Under the principles in Mumtaz, the ordinary sentences could not stand once juvenility was established, and the Board was to determine the appropriate order consistently with the applicable Juvenile Justice Act, 1986.

The High Court held appellants 5 and 6 to have been juveniles on the date of the offence and maintained their convictions, but set aside their sentences and remitted the matter to the jurisdictional Juvenile Justice Board to determine the appropriate punishment or order, in light of Jitendra Singh.

The appellants were directed to appear before the Board on 28 October 2026, and the Board was directed to pass its order within six weeks of receiving a certified copy of the judgment.