Allahabad High Court acquits father and uncle in POCSO case, finding child’s testimony unreliable amid matrimonial dispute and lack of medical corroboration

The appellants, Yatindra Mohan Bahuguna and Samoj Bahuguna, challenged their conviction by the Special Judge (POCSO), Varanasi, under Sections 376(2)(n)(f), 376-D, 323 and 506 IPC and Sections 5(g), 5(l), 5(m), 5(n) read with Section 6 of the POCSO Act.

They had been sentenced to life imprisonment under the POCSO Act.

The prosecution alleged that the seven-year-old victim was taken by her father, appellant no. 1, from Varanasi to Haldwani between 23 March and 3 April 2018, where she was subjected to sexual assault by her father and uncle, appellant no. 2.

The FIR was initially lodged at Varanasi on 8 June 2018 and the investigation was later transferred to Haldwani; the trial was subsequently transferred to Varanasi by the Supreme Court.

The prosecution principally relied on the testimony of the victim and her mother.

The medical examination found no external or internal injury, an intact hymen, and no spermatozoa; the examining doctor stated that insertion of a tube could ordinarily cause injury or bleeding.

The defence alleged tutoring, matrimonial and property disputes, delay in lodging the FIR, contradictions in the evidence, and lack of medical corroboration.

Whether the testimony of the child victim, in the face of alleged contradictions, possible tutoring, delayed FIR, and absence of medical corroboration, was sufficient to sustain conviction under the IPC and POCSO Act.

Whether the prosecution established the foundational facts necessary to invoke the presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act.

Whether the evidence established the involvement of both appellants, particularly appellant no. 2, beyond reasonable doubt.

Whether the delay in lodging the FIR was satisfactorily explained or indicated subsequent embellishment and fabrication of the prosecution case.

The Court considered Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 22 and 29 of the POCSO Act, including the distinction between sexual assault and penetrative/aggravated penetrative sexual assault, the statutory presumption under Section 29 once foundational facts are established, and the provision concerning false complaints under Section 22.

It also considered Sections 323, 376, 376(2)(n)(f), 376-D and 506 IPC.

On child testimony, the Court relied on Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan, Mangoo v. State of M.P., Panchhi v. State of U.P., Nivrutti Pandurang Kokate v. State of Maharashtra, State of M.P. v. Ramesh, and State of U.P. v. Krishna Master, holding that a child witness is competent but the evidence must be scrutinised with heightened caution; tutoring is not presumed merely because it is possible, and corroboration is not legally indispensable where the testimony is reliable and inspires confidence.

The Court also considered the principles that delay in reporting sexual offences is not automatically fatal and that absence of injuries or medical corroboration does not by itself discredit the victim’s testimony.

The Court found material inconsistencies between the victim’s testimony, her mother’s evidence, the FIR, the Section 161 and Section 164 statements, and the contemporaneous email sent by the mother to appellant no. 1.

It emphasised that the victim had spoken to her mother almost daily during her stay at Haldwani, possessed a mobile phone given by her father, and appeared cheerful in photographs taken during that period, yet did not disclose the alleged sexual acts during those communications or immediately while travelling to Varanasi.

The Court treated the later account concerning insertion of a tube as an embellishment developed during the period preceding the FIR, particularly in the context of matrimonial, property and divorce-related disputes.

The absence of injuries, bleeding or other medical findings was treated as materially inconsistent with the specific allegation of tube insertion.

The Court further inferred tutoring from the victim’s continued residence with her mother, the strained relationship between the parents, her use of her father’s name rather than “father,” and the absence of supporting testimony from the maternal grandparents or other independent witnesses.

On the totality of the evidence, the Court held that the prosecution had not proved the allegations beyond reasonable doubt and that appellant no. 2 had been implicated without sufficient evidence.

The conviction and sentence dated 11/13 February 2025 were set aside, and both appellants were acquitted of all charges.

Appellant no. 1, who was in custody, was directed to be released forthwith, while appellant no. 2, who was on bail, was not required to surrender; his bail bonds and sureties were discharged.