Allegation of counsel's negligence is insufficient to condone inordinate delay without demonstrating the litigant's due diligence.

The Petitioners filed a suit for declaration and injunction in 1997 regarding property in Village Tikri Kalan

The suit was dismissed for non-prosecution on 25.09.2008

An application for restoration under Order IX Rule 9 CPC was dismissed on 22.09.2014 due to non-payment of costs

A second application to restore the restoration application was dismissed on 08.08.2016 as time-barred

After withdrawing a petition under Article 227 and a subsequent application in 2017, the Petitioners filed an appeal under Order XLIII Rule 1(c) CPC along with a Section 5 Limitation Act application

The Appellate Court dismissed the appeal and the condonation application on 28.11.2025, leading to the present challenge

1. Whether the Petitioners established "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone a delay of approximately 32 months

2. Whether a litigant can seek exclusion of time under the Limitation Act for periods spent pursuing successive, non-statutory restoration applications instead of the prescribed appellate remedy

The court applied Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which requires the applicant to show "sufficient cause" for delay, noting that while the term should be construed pragmatically per State (NCT of Delhi) v. Ahmed Jaan, it does not permit a total lack of due diligence

The court considered Section 35B of the CPC regarding the effect of non-payment of costs and Order XLIII Rule 1(c) regarding appealable orders

The court distinguished Jaswant Singh v. Parkash Kaur, clarifying that the maintainability of an appeal does not automatically entitle a party to condonation of delay

The Court reasoned that the Petitioners were negligent by failing to pursue the statutory appellate remedy against the 2014 order for nearly two years, choosing instead to file successive restoration applications

It held that a party cannot keep limitation in abeyance by pursuing different proceedings and then seeking condonation after failing therein, as this would encourage dilatory tactics

The Court rejected the argument that "liberty to avail appropriate remedy" granted in earlier Article 227 proceedings operated to condone prior delays or entitle them to automatic exclusion of time

The Court found the "negligent counsel" plea insufficient, stating that litigants have a duty to remain vigilant and cannot pindown entire blame on advocates to excuse inordinate delays

The Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the Appellate Court’s findings that the delay was substantial and unexplained, and that mere maintainability of an appeal under Order XLIII Rule 1(c) does not dispense with the requirement to satisfy Section 5 of the Limitation Act