Alleged mineral extraction after permission expires may attract theft provisions and warrants investigation.

The petitioner, arrayed as accused No. 1, sought to quash an FIR registered under Section 303(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) and Section 21(1) of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (MMDR Act).

The prosecution alleged that, at about 7.30 p.m. on 10 April 2026, rocks were being broken and removed from Government poramboke and adjoining patta lands; police found two excavators, a tractor and three two-wheelers at the site.

The petitioner said she was a transport contractor engaged for a Primary Health Centre construction project, for which permission to cut and remove rocks had been granted from 14 March to 10 April 2026.

The State submitted that the permission authorised work only between 7.00 a.m. and 5.00 p.m. and had therefore expired before the alleged activity.

1. Whether the FIR should be quashed where the alleged rock-cutting and removal occurred after the permission had expired.

2. Whether the alleged conduct could attract Section 303(2) of the BNS despite the FIR not specifying the quantity or value of the minerals, and notwithstanding the petitioner’s reliance on earlier High Court orders.

The Court considered Section 303(2) of the BNS, concerning theft, and Section 21(1) of the MMDR Act, under which the FIR was registered.

It treated the subsistence and terms of the competent authority’s permission as material: the permission in this case authorised rock-cutting and removal only until 5.00 p.m. on 10 April 2026.

The Court further held that the absence of particulars about mineral quantity or value in the FIR did not, at the investigation stage, warrant quashing; it observed that breaking rocks, if proved, could attract Section 303(2), even if the minerals had not been moved outside the survey number.

The Court distinguished Devanandh v. State of Tamil Nadu, Crl.O.P.(MD) No. 19885 of 2025, and Dhas v. State of Tamil Nadu, Crl.O.P.(MD) No. 20483 of 2025, on their facts.

The alleged activity occurred at 7.30 p.m., after the permission had expired at 5.00 p.m.; accordingly, the petitioner could not rely on valid permission at the relevant time.

Whether she knew that the permission had expired was a disputed factual question for investigation, not determination in a petition to quash the FIR.

The Court rejected the characterisation of the incident as merely a breach of the permitted working hours because the permission itself had lapsed.

It also found that the absence of quantity or value particulars did not justify quashing at this stage, and held that the cited decisions did not govern the materially different facts.

It dismissed the Criminal Original Petition and closed the connected miscellaneous petition.