Amendment altering promotional eligibility is valid; reduced chances of promotion do not constitute vested service rights.

The petitioners were appointed as Regional Youth Welfare and Prantiya Rakshak Dal Officers on the recommendation of the Public Service Commission by order dated 26 November 2008. Vyayam Prashikshaks/Physical Instructors were also appointed on the same date in a separate cadre. Both posts were classified as Group ‘C’ posts and carried the same pay scale.

Under the 2014 service rules, eligible Regional Youth Welfare and Prantiya Rakshak Dal Officers were placed en bloc above Vyayam Prashikshaks in the combined eligibility list for promotion to the post of District Youth Welfare and Prantiya Rakshak Dal Officer.

By the Uttarakhand Youth Welfare and Prantiya Rakshak Dal Gazetted Officer Service (Amendment) Rules, 2015, notified on 13 August 2015, the relevant Note to Rule 5(d) was substituted. The amended provision required a joint eligibility list to be prepared according to the date of substantive appointment in the respective cadres.

The petitioners challenged the validity of the amended Note, contending that it removed their earlier preference and would adversely affect their promotional prospects.

They also relied on a subsequent departmental letter proposing preparation of the eligibility list in the ratio of 95:63, corresponding to the cadre strength of the two posts.

1. Whether the Note appended to Rule 5(d)(ii) of the 2015 Amendment Rules, which prescribed preparation of a joint eligibility list based on the date of substantive appointment, was manifestly arbitrary and liable to be struck down under Article 14 of the Constitution.

2. Whether the amendment unlawfully curtailed the petitioners’ promotional rights or violated any vested or accrued service right.

3. Whether the departmental decision to prepare the eligibility list in the ratio of 95:63 was contrary to the statutory service rules.

Recruitment rules framed by the State under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution possess plenary authority, and subordinate legislation may be invalidated only on grounds such as lack of legislative competence, ultra vires action, violation of fundamental rights, manifest arbitrariness, excessive delegation, or procedural impropriety.

Under Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (1996) 10 SCC 304, delegated legislation can be struck down for arbitrariness only when it is manifestly arbitrary—so unreasonable that it could not have emanated from the delegated law-making authority or conforms neither to the enabling statute nor to Article 14.

Sharma Transport v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, (2002) 2 SCC 188, explains manifest arbitrariness as conduct that is capricious, unreasonable, non-rational, or unsupported by any determining principle.

The State may alter recruitment policies, restructure cadres, and amend service rules to meet administrative requirements; employees have no vested right to promotion under an existing rule or to a particular promotional opportunity, although an accrued or vested right cannot be taken away unlawfully.

The Court held that the amendment did not eliminate or reduce the prescribed promotional quota: 50% of the posts of District Youth Welfare and Prantiya Rakshak Dal Officer continued to be filled by promotion and the remaining 50% by direct recruitment.

It merely changed the method of arranging eligible candidates by replacing the earlier cadre-based preference with a joint list based on substantive appointment dates.

Since both cadres had the same status and pay scale, the earlier system placed Vyayam Prashikshaks en bloc below the petitioners and materially disadvantaged them in promotion.

The amended rule was therefore considered an egalitarian measure supported by a rational basis, particularly in light of the increased cadre strength of Vyayam Prashikshaks from 13 to 63 posts, as compared with 95 posts in the petitioners’ cadre.

The petitioners could not demonstrate that the amendment was manifestly arbitrary or that it affected any vested or accrued right; a mere reduction in the chance or prospect of promotion was insufficient to invalidate the rule.

The Court further held that the proposed 95:63 ratio was inconsistent with the express statutory rules, which required preparation of the joint list according to substantive appointment dates.

The Court held that the amended method of preparing the joint eligibility list was neither manifestly arbitrary nor violative of any vested or accrued right, and that the petitioners’ reduced promotional prospects did not constitute a legally protected service condition.

The departmental decision to prepare the list in the ratio of 95:63 was disapproved as contrary to the statutory service rules.

The writ petition was accordingly disposed of with the observation that no action could be taken contrary to the rules.