An acquittal cannot be disturbed where material inconsistencies support a reasonable view favouring the accused.

On 31 August 2023, the informant alleged that the respondent and others came to Vindhyawasini Hospital and fired at Rang Nath Chauhan, causing firearm injuries.

An FIR was registered under Sections 307 and 326 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 27 of the Arms Act. After investigation, a charge-sheet was filed and the respondent was tried in Sessions Trial No. 250 of 2024.

The prosecution examined eight witnesses and produced documentary evidence, including the injury report and seizure list.

The Trial Court acquitted the respondent on the grounds of material contradictions regarding the weapon and number of shots, non-recovery of the alleged firearm, non-production of seized cartridges and CCTV footage, and doubts concerning identification.

The State preferred an appeal against acquittal under Section 378(1) and (3) CrPC/Section 419(1) and (3) BNSS.

Whether the prosecution established the time and manner of the occurrence beyond reasonable doubt, particularly in view of the discrepancy regarding the time of occurrence and the non-production of CCTV footage?

Whether the testimony of P.W.1, the alleged eyewitness and informant, was sufficiently consistent and reliable to sustain the prosecution case against the respondent?

Whether the Trial Court’s findings of acquittal were so perverse, illegal or manifestly erroneous as to warrant appellate interference?

The Court applied the principles governing appeals against acquittal under Section 378 CrPC/Section 419 BNSS, including the rule that although an appellate court may reappreciate the evidence, interference is justified only where the Trial Court’s view is perverse, unreasonable or manifestly erroneous; where two reasonable views are possible, the view favouring the accused should ordinarily be maintained.

The prosecution was required to prove the respondent’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and proof that the victim sustained injuries did not, by itself, establish the respondent’s identity or complicity.

In Tomaso Bruno v. State of U.P., (2015) 7 SCC 178, the Supreme Court held that withholding material CCTV footage, where available and capable of objectively establishing the occurrence, may raise serious doubts about the prosecution case.

Under Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras, AIR 1957 SC 614, a conviction may rest on a solitary eyewitness, but where the testimony is neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable, corroboration is required.

The principles in Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415, and Babu v. State of Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189, reaffirm that a plausible view resulting in acquittal should not be disturbed merely because another view is possible.

The substantive charges were under Sections 307 and 326 IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act.

The Court found that P.W.1’s account contained material inconsistencies: the FIR/fardbeyan referred to a pistol, whereas his deposition referred to a rifle; he stated that the victim sustained three gunshot injuries, while only two used cartridges were recovered; and the prosecution version regarding the time of occurrence was inconsistent, with P.W.1 stating approximately 7:30 p.m. while the FIR recorded receipt of information at 7:15 p.m.

The CCTV footage, which could have objectively established the time, presence and manner of the occurrence, was neither produced nor proved in accordance with law.

Since the remaining witnesses did not provide independent eyewitness corroboration and the alleged weapon was not recovered, the Court held that P.W.1’s testimony did not inspire sufficient confidence to justify reversal of the acquittal.

These deficiencies arose from the prosecution evidence itself and provided a reasonable basis for the Trial Court to extend the benefit of doubt.

Consequently, the Trial Court’s view was held to be a possible and plausible view, not a perverse or legally unsustainable one.

It held that the prosecution failed to establish the time and manner of the occurrence beyond reasonable doubt, that P.W.1’s testimony was materially inconsistent and insufficiently corroborated, and that the Trial Court’s acquittal did not suffer from perversity, illegality or manifest error.

The State’s appeal was dismissed at the admission stage, and any pending interlocutory applications were disposed of.