An acquittal cannot be reversed unless the trial court’s view is perverse or demonstrably unsustainable.

The State appealed against the judgment dated 30 August 2003 by which the Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Dhrangadhra, acquitted the respondents of offences under Sections 376, 366, 363 and 114 of the Indian Penal Code (“IPC”) in Sessions Case No. 19 of 2002.

The prosecution alleged that accused No. 1 kidnapped the prosecutrix, Naynaben, from the lawful guardianship of her parents on 7 February 2002, took her to Sarbhan, committed rape, threatened her, and kept her at the house of Natubhai for approximately twelve days; accused No. 2 was alleged to have participated in the incident.

The State contended that the prosecutrix was a minor and that her minority was established through her School Leaving Certificate.

It further argued that the prosecutrix had testified that she became unconscious after being placed in a shuttle rickshaw and regained consciousness after approximately one hour.

The respondents did not appear despite service of notice.

Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the prosecutrix was a minor at the time of the alleged incident, so as to sustain the charges under Sections 363 and 366 IPC?

Whether the prosecution established the allegations of rape and abduction against the respondents beyond reasonable doubt?

Whether the trial court’s order of acquittal was perverse, manifestly erroneous, or demonstrably unsustainable so as to justify appellate interference?

The Court considered Sections 376, 366, 363 and 114 IPC, under which the prosecution was required to prove the constituent elements of rape, kidnapping or abduction, taking or enticing a minor from lawful guardianship, and abetment, respectively.

In assessing the prosecutrix’s age, the Court applied Section 35 of the Evidence Act, 1872, holding that a school record or School Leaving Certificate must be properly proved and its reliability assessed before it can establish age; it relied on Ram Suresh Singh v. Prabhat Singh @ Chhotu Singh, (2009) 6 SCC 681, and Birad Mal Singhvi v. Anand Purohit, 1988 Supp SCC 604.

The Court also applied the principle that, in an appeal against acquittal, interference is permissible only where the trial court’s view is perverse or unsustainable, and not merely because another view is possible.

It relied on Bhupatbhai Bachubhai Chavda v. State, [2024] 4 S.C.R. 322, reiterating that acquittal strengthens the presumption of innocence and that the prosecution retains the burden of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The Court found that the prosecution had not reliably established the prosecutrix’s minority.

Although a School Leaving Certificate was produced, no birth certificate or village-panchayat birth record was placed on record, and the complainant’s evidence disclosed an anomaly concerning her place of birth; consequently, the school record was not treated as conclusive proof of age.

The Court further noted inconsistencies regarding the date of the alleged incident: the prosecutrix reportedly gave 10 February 2002 as the date before the Medical Officer, whereas the complaint referred to 7 February 2002.

The evidence concerning the prosecutrix’s stay at Natubhai’s house was also considered inconsistent, particularly as accused No. 1 allegedly left after one night and did not return, while the prosecutrix remained there for twelve days.

The medical certificate did not establish the allegation of rape, and the Court also observed that the record contained no substantive allegation connecting accused No. 2 with the offence beyond his alleged accompaniment of accused No. 1.

In these circumstances, the trial court’s view was held to be a plausible view based on the evidence and not perverse or demonstrably unsustainable.

It held that the prosecution failed to establish the prosecutrix’s minority and failed to prove the allegations of rape, kidnapping, abduction, or abetment beyond reasonable doubt.

Since the trial court’s acquittal was a plausible view and no perversity or manifest error was demonstrated, the Court declined to interfere with the judgment dated 30 August 2003.

The appeal was dismissed, the acquittal of the respondents was confirmed, and any bail bonds were directed to stand cancelled; the record and proceedings were ordered to be returned to the trial court.