An acquittal cannot be reversed where the trial court adopted a reasonable view of the evidence.

The prosecution alleged that on 1 July 2013, the respondent rode a motorcycle rashly and negligently on the Pakshikere–Haleyangadi Road, struck Vijay near a school bus stop, and failed to comply with his duties after the accident.

Vijay later died of his injuries.

The respondent was charged under Sections 279 and 304A of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 134(a) and 134(b), read with Section 187, of the Motor Vehicles Act.

The trial court acquitted him in C.C. No. 432 of 2013.

The State appealed against the acquittal, arguing that the trial court had not properly assessed the evidence, particularly that of PW1, the deceased’s brother and the alleged eyewitness.

Whether the State had established grounds for appellate interference with the trial court’s judgment of acquittal.

What order should follow.

The appeal was brought under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

The Court applied the principles governing appeals against acquittal, relying on Constable 907 Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, (2025) 5 SCC 433; Babu Sahebgouda Rudrగౌదar v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 8 SCC 149; Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415; and H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581.

An acquittal reinforces the presumption of innocence.

Although an appellate court may reappreciate the evidence, it should not reverse an acquittal where the trial court’s view is reasonably possible; interference is warranted where the judgment is perverse, materially misreads or omits evidence, or the evidence permits only a conclusion of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The Court found no basis to displace the trial court’s assessment.

The case on the manner of driving rested principally on PW1’s evidence, which the trial court found ambiguous and inconsistent with his earlier statement; the Court also noted that the complaint was filed two days after the incident and that the prosecution had not explained the delay.

In the absence of supportive evidence resolving the uncertainty about how the accident occurred, the trial court’s view that rash or negligent riding had not been established was a reasonably possible one.

The Court therefore found no factual or legal error warranting appellate intervention.

The trial court’s acquittal of the respondent was left undisturbed.