An acquittal cannot be reversed where the trial court’s view is plausible on the evidence.

On 25 May 2015, Pancho Bai was allegedly hit by a motorcycle bearing registration No. CG 04 DN 6009 while she was going to a pond. She sustained serious injuries and died while being taken to hospital.

An FIR was registered, and after investigation the respondent was charge-sheeted. The Trial Court framed charges under Sections 279 and 304-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, but acquitted him on 28 November 2022 by extending the benefit of doubt. The State preferred an appeal under Section 378(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Although the respondent could not be traced and a warrant had been issued, the High Court heard the appeal finally with the State’s consent.

The prosecution examined seven witnesses, including eyewitnesses and the doctor who conducted the post-mortem.

Whether the Trial Court’s acquittal of the respondent for offences under Sections 279 and 304-A IPC was perverse, illegal, or otherwise warranting interference in an appeal against acquittal.

Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the respondent was driving the motorcycle rashly and negligently and caused the death of Pancho Bai.

The Court applied Sections 279 and 304-A IPC, which respectively penalise rash or negligent driving on a public way and causing death by a rash or negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide.

The appeal was governed by Section 378(3) CrPC concerning appeals against acquittal.

The Court relied on State of Rajasthan v. Kistoora Ram, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 984, for the principle that an appellate court should not interfere with an acquittal unless the view taken by the Trial Court is impossible or perverse; where two views are possible, the view favourable to the accused must ordinarily be maintained.

It also relied on Jafarudheen v. State of Kerala, (2022) 8 SCC 440, holding that an acquittal strengthens the accused’s presumption of innocence and may be reversed only after thorough scrutiny on recognised legal parameters.

The medical evidence established that Pancho Bai died from accidental injuries, but it did not establish the identity of the person driving the motorcycle or the manner of driving.

The complainant, PW-3, admitted that he had not witnessed the accident and could not state who was driving or how the motorcycle was being driven.

Other prosecution witnesses were declared hostile or gave evidence based on information received from others; their police statements did not consistently record that they had witnessed the accident or that the respondent was driving rashly and negligently.

Consequently, there was no clinching or corroborative evidence proving beyond reasonable doubt that the respondent was the driver responsible for the accident.

The Trial Court’s decision to extend the benefit of doubt was therefore a possible and plausible view, and not perverse or illegal.

It held that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the respondent had driven the motorcycle rashly or negligently and caused Pancho Bai’s death.

The Trial Court’s acquittal was found to be a permissible and properly reasoned view, immune from interference under the limited scope governing appeals against acquittal.

Accordingly, the acquittal appeal was dismissed.