An acquittal cannot be reversed where the trial court’s view is reasonably possible.

On 26 September 1989, an injured male child aged approximately four to five years was found near Bhero Ghat and taken to the police station and for medical treatment.

The following day, the bodies of a woman and a male child were recovered from the vicinity.

The prosecution alleged that the deceased woman, Sushma, had travelled from Kanpur towards Khajuraho with her two sons and the appellant, her estranged husband, on 20 September 1989, and that the appellant had strangulated Sushma and one of their sons and attempted to kill the surviving child.

Two FIRs were registered on 1 October 1989.

During investigation, the surviving child, examined as PW-28, allegedly stated that he had witnessed the appellant killing his mother and brother.

The Additional Sessions Judge, Panna acquitted the appellant under Sections 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code, finding the child’s testimony unreliable and the corroborative evidence insufficient.

On the State’s appeals, the Madhya Pradesh High Court reversed the acquittal and convicted the appellant under Sections 302 and 201 IPC, sentencing him to life imprisonment and two years’ rigorous imprisonment, respectively.

Whether the High Court was justified in reversing the appellant’s acquittal when the Trial Court’s view was a reasonably possible view on the evidence?

Whether the testimony of the child witness, PW-28, was sufficiently reliable to sustain the appellant’s conviction, particularly in the absence of independent corroboration and in light of the alleged tutoring and medical inconsistencies?

Whether the prosecution established a complete and reliable chain of circumstantial evidence—including motive, last-seen evidence, recoveries, forensic material, and the appellant’s conduct—proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt?

The Court applied Sections 302 and 201 IPC concerning murder and causing disappearance of evidence.

In an appeal against acquittal, the accused enjoys a double presumption of innocence, and interference is justified only where the Trial Court’s view is unreasonable or unsustainable; where two reasonable conclusions are possible, the acquittal should not be disturbed, as stated in Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka.

A child is a competent witness, but because a child may be susceptible to tutoring, the testimony must be carefully scrutinised and ordinarily requires corroboration as a matter of prudence, consistent with Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P.

In cases based on circumstantial evidence, every incriminating circumstance must be proved by reliable evidence and form a complete chain pointing only to the guilt of the accused; suspicion, however strong, cannot substitute proof.

The last-seen theory applies only where the time gap and surrounding circumstances substantially exclude the possibility of another offender, and corroboration should ordinarily be sought, as reaffirmed in Karakkattu Muhammed Basheer v. State of Kerala and the authorities cited therein.

The Supreme Court held that the High Court failed to respect the enhanced presumption of innocence arising from the Trial Court’s acquittal.

The Trial Court had rational grounds for doubting PW-28’s evidence: the child was only about four and a half years old at the time of the incident, his statement was recorded four years later, he admitted that a police officer had tutored him, and his allegation that the appellant had strangulated and attacked him with acid was not supported by the medical evidence.

The account that the child repeatedly awoke, witnessed separate killings, and then returned to sleep was also considered unnatural.

The remaining evidence did not complete the chain of circumstances.

The post-mortem evidence was inconclusive because the bodies were decomposed, the blood analysis yielded no usable result, and no forensic link connected the recovered clothes or bottle to the appellant or the deceased.

The independent witnesses to the alleged confession and recovery turned hostile, while the recoveries made six months after discovery of the bodies were doubtful and could have been planted.

The prosecution also failed to establish motive or last-seen evidence: witnesses did not identify the person who left with Sushma and the children as the appellant, and one witness specifically stated that the person in the car was not the appellant.

The failure to trace or examine the relevant vehicle drivers and the unexplained delay in registering the FIR, despite the child’s alleged disclosure of the appellant’s identity before registration, further weakened the prosecution case.

Consequently, the evidence did not exclude reasonable hypotheses consistent with innocence.

It held that the prosecution had failed to prove the appellant’s guilt under Sections 302 and 201 IPC beyond reasonable doubt and that the High Court was not justified in reversing the Trial Court’s acquittal.

The appellant was acquitted of all charges, his bail bonds were discharged, and pending applications were disposed of.