An acquittal must stand where the trial court’s evidence-based view is reasonable and not perverse.

The complainant alleged that the accused raped her at knifepoint in her home on 22 November 2019 while she was alone.

Her husband returned during the incident, and the accused allegedly hid under the bed before fleeing.

The complainant lodged an FIR on 3 December 2019.

After trial, the Sessions Court acquitted the accused of offences under Sections 376 and 506(2) IPC and Section 135 of the Gujarat Police Act, finding the complainant’s testimony unreliable and the prosecution case improbable.

The complainant appealed under Section 413 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, corresponding to Section 372 CrPC.

1. Whether the Sessions Court was justified in acquitting the accused, or whether its findings warranted appellate interference.

2. Whether the complainant’s testimony was sufficiently reliable to sustain a conviction without corroboration.

Under Section 413 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (corresponding to Section 372 CrPC), an appeal may be brought against an acquittal.

An appellate court should respect the reinforced presumption of innocence following acquittal and interfere where the decision is perverse or compelling circumstances justify intervention; it should not interfere merely because another view is possible.

A complainant’s sole testimony may sustain a conviction if it is reliable and trustworthy.

In Rai Sandeep v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2012) 8 SCC 21, the Court described a “sterling witness” as one whose account is consistent, credible, and withstands scrutiny.

Krishan Kumar Malik v. State of Haryana, (2011) 7 SCC 130, similarly states that uncorroborated testimony may suffice when it inspires confidence, but not when material inconsistencies or deficiencies undermine its reliability.

The High Court found material inconsistencies that affected the complainant’s credibility: she did not testify that the accused hid under the bed, although this was part of the prosecution account; the neighbours did not support the prosecution’s account of the incident or the accused’s presence; and the complainant and her husband gave different times for his arrival.

The complainant’s account to the doctor also differed from the FIR and her testimony about how the accused entered the house.

The Court further considered the 12-day delay in reporting, for which it found the explanation unconvincing.

Taken together, these matters raised reasonable doubt, and the Sessions Court’s assessment was neither perverse nor contrary to the evidence.

The Court therefore declined to interfere under the principles governing appeals against acquittal.

The appeal was dismissed at the admission stage.