An acquittal must stand where the trial court’s view is reasonable and possible.

On 16 November 1995 at approximately 5:00 p.m., the complainant, Babubhai Dhanabhai, and his father, Dhanabhai Gandabhai, were ploughing their field at Gharoda village when the accused allegedly allowed their cows to graze in the field.

Upon objection, the accused allegedly abused and assaulted the complainant and his father with sticks; the assault stopped after witnesses intervened.

The police filed a charge-sheet for offences under Sections 307, 323, 325 and 504 read with Section 114 of the Indian Penal Code.

The Additional Sessions Judge, Nadiad, acquitted both accused in Sessions Case No. 348 of 1999 by judgment dated 23 October 2003.

The State challenged the acquittal under Section 378(1) and (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Whether the evidence of the complainant, injured witness, eyewitness and medical officer established beyond reasonable doubt that the respondents had assaulted the complainant and his father and committed the charged offences under the IPC?

Whether the trial court’s order of acquittal was perverse, unreasonable, or based on a misreading or omission of material evidence so as to justify appellate interference under Section 378 CrPC?

Whether, where two reasonable views were possible on the evidence, the High Court could substitute its view for the view adopted by the trial court?

The Court applied Section 378(1) and (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, governing appeals against acquittal.

Although an appellate court may fully review and reappreciate the evidence, an acquittal carries a strengthened double presumption of innocence; interference is justified only where the trial court’s view is patently perverse, rests on misreading or non-consideration of material evidence, or where the evidence permits only a conclusion of guilt and no other reasonable view.

The Court relied on Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, as restated in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, and H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, for these principles.

It also referred to Constable 907 Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, (2025) 2 SCR 239, and State of Karnataka v. Hemareddy @ Vemareddy, AIR 1981 SC 1417, concerning the limited scope of interference with a reasoned appellate or trial-court finding and the need not to repeat the evidence where the court agrees with the reasons below.

The substantive charges arose under Sections 307, 323, 325, 504 and 114 IPC.

The High Court found material inconsistencies in the prosecution evidence regarding the identity of the assailant and the attribution of particular injuries.

The complainant and injured witness did not consistently state that accused Bhopabhai Shanabhai had caused the injuries; their evidence substantially attributed the assault to Babubhai Shanabhai alone, despite the prosecution case involving two accused.

The testimony of witness Bachubhai Ashabhai contained further discrepancies regarding who injured whom and on which body part, and the witness was found not to be a reliable eyewitness, having made material improvements over his Section 161 CrPC statement.

The medical history also created doubt because the injured witness was allegedly unconscious when taken to hospital, yet a history was recorded stating that an unidentified person had assaulted him with sticks; moreover, the assailants’ names were not disclosed to the doctor.

While the absence of names in the medical history was not, by itself, decisive, it reinforced the material contradictions in the oral evidence.

Consequently, the trial court’s assessment of the evidence and its conclusion that the prosecution case was unreliable constituted a possible and reasonable view, not a perverse one warranting interference under Section 378 CrPC.

It held that the prosecution had not proved the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt and that the trial court’s acquittal was neither perverse nor legally or factually unreasonable.

Applying the rule that, where two reasonable views are possible, the view favouring the accused must be adopted, the Court dismissed the State’s criminal appeal.

The respondents’ bail bonds, if any, were cancelled, their sureties discharged, and the record and proceedings were directed to be returned to the trial court.