An agreement to sell an undivided share remains specifically enforceable despite erroneous khasra particulars.

The appellant-plaintiff alleged that respondent-defendant No.1 agreed to sell his 1/15th share, measuring 3 kanals 15 marlas out of 56 kanals 5 marlas, and executed agreements to sell dated 14 February 1983 and 27 June 1983 after receiving the entire consideration of Rs.9,000/- in two instalments.

The sale deed was to be executed within one month after sanction of mutation in defendant No.1’s favour. The plaintiff also claimed delivery of possession and asserted that he had performed his part of the contract.

Before execution of the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff, defendant No.1 sold the property to defendants No.2 and 3 by sale deed dated 30 December 1987 for Rs.25,000/-. The plaintiff instituted the suit for specific performance on 7 January 1988, alternatively seeking recovery of Rs.18,000/-.

The trial Court decreed specific performance. The First Appellate Court upheld the findings regarding execution of the agreements, payment of consideration, limitation, and the purchasers’ lack of bona fide status, but denied specific performance on the ground that the property description was vague and granted recovery of the amount paid instead. The plaintiff preferred the present regular second appeal.

1. Whether the agreements to sell dated 14 February 1983 and 27 June 1983 sufficiently identified the property and were capable of specific enforcement, notwithstanding the defendant’s ownership of an undivided 1/15th share in joint land?

2. Whether the suit for specific performance was within limitation and maintainable despite the agreement providing for execution of the sale deed after sanction of mutation?

3. Whether defendants No.2 and 3 were bona fide purchasers for value without notice of the prior agreements to sell?

4. Whether the concurrent findings regarding execution of the agreements, payment of the entire consideration, and the plaintiff’s readiness and willingness warranted interference in second appeal?

The Court applied the principles governing specific performance under the Specific Relief Act, 1963, including the requirement that the contract and the property be sufficiently identifiable, the relevance of the plaintiff’s performance and readiness and willingness, and the enforceability of a prior agreement against a subsequent transferee having notice under Section 19(b).

The Court also applied the limitation principle under Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963, holding that where no fixed date is prescribed, limitation runs from the date when performance is refused; a subsequent sale inconsistent with the prior agreement constitutes clear refusal.

General principles relating to transfer of an undivided share in joint property were also applied.

No specific judicial precedent was cited in the judgment.

The High Court upheld the concurrent factual findings that defendant No.1 executed both agreements and received the entire consideration of Rs.9,000/-, relying on the evidence of the scribe and attesting witnesses and rejecting defendant No.1’s bare denial.

It held that the suit was neither premature nor time-barred because the sale by defendant No.1 to defendants No.2 and 3 before mutation was sanctioned amounted to a clear refusal to perform the prior agreement.

The Court further found that defendants No.2 and 3 had notice of the prior agreement, as they were co-villagers and the evidence showed that they became aware of it before entering into their agreement and obtaining the sale deed; consequently, they were not bona fide purchasers without notice.

On the principal issue, the Court held that the First Appellate Court had wrongly treated the agreement as vague merely because some khasra numbers did not correspond exactly with the jamabandi.

The agreement identified the property by reference to the total joint holding of 56 kanals 5 marlas and the defendant’s 1/15th share measuring 3 kanals 15 marlas. The jamabandi established defendant No.1’s 1/15th ownership, while the subsequent sale deed itself described the transferred interest as 3 kanals 15 marlas.

Thus, the identity and extent of the subject matter were sufficiently ascertainable, and any discrepancy in individual khasra numbers did not defeat specific performance.

Since the plaintiff had already paid the entire consideration and the subsequent sale was found to have been made to defeat his contractual rights, specific performance was the appropriate relief.

Accordingly, the judgment and decree dated 16 May 1997 of the First Appellate Court, which had substituted refund of the consideration for specific performance, was set aside.

The trial Court’s decree granting specific performance and possession of the suit property was restored, and the regular second appeal was allowed.