An agreement to sell does not extinguish an existing tenancy absent proven surrender or change in possession.

The respondents’ predecessor instituted S.C.C. Suit No. 109 of 2019 seeking eviction of the revisionists from the disputed shop, alleging default in payment of rent from 1 January 2003 to 31 August 2019 and determining the tenancy by notice dated 1 September 2019.

The monthly rent was pleaded to be ₹3,000, taking the tenancy outside the protection of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972.

The revisionists admitted that they had initially entered possession as tenants but contended that an agreement to sell dated 24 December 2002, coupled with a separate possession letter and payment of the entire sale consideration of ₹1,10,000, changed the character of their possession and extinguished the landlord–tenant relationship.

The Small Causes Court decreed the suit on 14 May 2026. The revisionists challenged that decree under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887.

1. Whether execution of the agreement to sell dated 24 December 2002, payment of the sale consideration, and the alleged delivery of possession converted the revisionists’ possession from that of tenants into possession in part performance under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and thereby extinguished the existing tenancy.

2. Whether the pre-existing landlord–tenant relationship was expressly or impliedly surrendered or otherwise determined in accordance with law.

3. Whether the alleged possession letter and other surrounding circumstances could establish a change in the juridical character of possession despite the contrary recital in the registered agreement to sell.

4. Whether the notice dated 1 September 2019 was invalid merely because the arrears demanded included amounts allegedly barred by limitation.

5. Whether the rent deposits and tenders relied upon by the revisionists displaced the finding of default.

6. Whether the findings of the Small Causes Court disclosed jurisdictional error, perversity, or material irregularity warranting interference under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887.

The Court applied Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887, under which revisional interference is confined to jurisdictional error, material irregularity, perversity, or an error of law and does not permit a general re-appreciation of evidence as in an appeal.

Under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, possession must be delivered or continued in part performance of a contract and must have a demonstrable nexus with that contract; mere execution of an agreement to sell, payment of consideration, or continuation of pre-existing possession is insufficient.

Sections 111(e) and 111(f) of the Transfer of Property Act require the existing tenancy to be shown to have been expressly or impliedly surrendered or otherwise determined; an agreement to sell does not ipso facto extinguish a subsisting tenancy.

The Court relied on Nazim Shaikh Hasan v. Nasir Mushtaq Shaikh, H.K. Sharma v. Ram Lal, Vayyaeti Srinivasarao v. Gaineedi Jagajyothi, R. Kanthimathi v. Beatrice Xavier, Kashi Nath Mehrotra v. Roop Narayan Chaudhari, and Smt. Shakuntala Devi for these principles.

The terms of a registered instrument cannot ordinarily be displaced by an inconsistent subsequent unregistered or oral arrangement, relying on Chandrakant Shankarao Machale v. Parubai Bhairu Mohite and S. Saktivel v. M. Venugopal Pillai.

A notice determining tenancy must be construed as a whole and according to its substance; inclusion of time-barred arrears does not invalidate the notice if its intention to terminate the tenancy is clear, as recognised in Khadi Gram Udyog Trust v. Shri Ram Chandraji Virajman Mandir, L.M. Joshi v. K.M. Parikh, Bhagabandas Agarwalla v. Bhagwandas Kanu, and B.R. Trading Company v. Dharam Raj Sahu.

The Court held that the revisionists were already in possession as tenants before the agreement to sell; therefore, their continued physical possession did not itself prove delivery of possession in part performance.

The registered agreement expressly stated that possession would be delivered only upon execution of the sale deed, directly contradicting the claim of contemporaneous delivery on 24 December 2002.

The separate possession letter was disputed, unregistered, unsupported by the testimony of its attesting witnesses, and insufficiently proved; nor did the surrounding evidence establish that possession thereafter was held in a capacity different from that of a tenant.

Payment of the full consideration created contractual rights but neither transferred title nor automatically terminated the tenancy.

The revisionists’ later rent deposits also constituted conduct consistent with the continued existence of the tenancy.

The notice, read as a whole, clearly demanded rent and communicated the landlord’s intention to terminate the tenancy; the possible limitation of part of the monetary claim affected recoverability of arrears, not the validity of the notice itself.

The deposits and tenders did not, without proof that they satisfied all legally applicable requirements and covered the rent due, disprove default.

Since the Small Causes Court had adopted a legally sustainable view based on the evidence, no ground for revisional interference was established.

The notice dated 1 September 2019 validly determined the tenancy notwithstanding the inclusion of allegedly time-barred arrears.

The finding of default was not shown to be perverse or legally infirm, and the Small Causes Court’s judgment and decree dated 14 May 2026 disclosed no jurisdictional error or material irregularity.

The revision was accordingly dismissed, the eviction decree was affirmed, and there was no order as to costs.