An appellate court must not disturb an acquittal where the trial court’s view is reasonable and plausible.

The State preferred an appeal under Section 378 CrPC against the judgment dated 12 April 2022 by which the Additional Sessions Judge, Sitapur acquitted Gyan Prakash @ Gyani of offences under Sections 376 and 511 IPC in Sessions Trial No. 274 of 2015 arising from Case Crime No. 111 of 2014, Police Station Kotwali City, Sitapur.

The prosecution alleged that on 22 February 2014 the accused pulled the victim into a room and attempted to rape her, but released her when she raised an alarm.

The prosecution examined the victim, her father, medical witnesses, police officials and other formal witnesses.

The trial court acquitted the accused after finding material contradictions between the victim’s written report, Section 164 CrPC statement and court deposition; her admission that she had been tutored by her father; non-support from independent neighbourhood witnesses; non-examination of her mother; an alleged property-related monetary dispute between the accused and the victim’s father; and medical evidence showing no injuries, an intact hymen and absence of spermatozoa.

1. Whether the trial court’s appreciation of the prosecution evidence and acquittal of the accused were perverse, legally untenable or contrary to the evidence so as to warrant interference in an appeal against acquittal?

2. Whether the testimony of the victim constituted sufficiently reliable or “sterling” evidence to establish the accused’s guilt under Sections 376/511 IPC beyond reasonable doubt?

An appellate court has power under Section 378 CrPC to review and reappreciate the evidence in an appeal against acquittal, but must exercise that power with restraint because an acquitted accused enjoys a strengthened or double presumption of innocence.

Where two reasonable views are possible, the view favourable to the accused should ordinarily not be disturbed; interference is justified only where the trial court’s approach is patently illegal, perverse, manifestly unjust, or based on a complete misreading of material evidence.

The Court relied on Bannareddy v. State of Karnataka, (2018) 5 SCC 790; Jayamma v. State of Karnataka, (2021) 6 SCC 213; Babu v. State of Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189; Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415; Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P., (2008) 10 SCC 450; Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of Gujarat, (1996) 9 SCC 225; and Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471, which establish these principles.

The Court further applied Rai Sandeep Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi), AIR 2012 SC 3157, concerning the requirement that testimony relied upon as sole evidence should possess the quality of a “sterling witness”.

The High Court found that the trial court had carefully assessed the victim’s testimony and reasonably identified material inconsistencies concerning how she reached the place of occurrence and how the alleged incident unfolded.

The victim’s admission that her testimony before the Magistrate and the trial court had been given at her father’s instance and after tutoring materially affected the reliability of her evidence.

The prosecution’s case was further weakened by the denial of the occurrence by independent neighbourhood witnesses, the failure to examine the victim’s mother, and evidence suggesting a property-related monetary dispute between the accused and the victim’s father.

The medical evidence did not corroborate the alleged assault, as it disclosed no external or internal injuries, an intact hymen and no spermatozoa.

In these circumstances, the High Court held that the victim did not meet the standard of a wholly reliable or sterling witness and that the trial court’s view was at least a reasonable and plausible view.

Therefore, the stringent principles governing interference with acquittal were not satisfied.

The government appeal was accordingly dismissed, and the acquittal of Gyan Prakash @ Gyani was affirmed.