An executing court cannot award back wages omitted from the final decree.

The respondent, a CISF Constable, was removed from service on 2 March 1983; his departmental appeal was rejected.

He thereafter instituted Civil Suit No. 113-A/1991, which was decreed by the trial court, directing reinstatement and payment of back wages and increments from 2 March 1983.

The first appellate court reversed the decree.

In Second Appeal No. 365/1996, the High Court set aside the appellate judgment, quashed the removal order, and modified the punishment by placing the respondent at the lowest stage of the pay scale with cumulative effect, but did not expressly direct payment of back wages.

Pursuant to the High Court’s judgment, the respondent’s service was regularised, his pay was refixed, and his retiral dues were paid.

The Executing Court directed payment of back wages by order dated 12 January 2024, which was challenged by the CISF under Article 226 of the Constitution.

Whether the decree passed by the High Court in Second Appeal No. 365/1996 granted or preserved the respondent’s entitlement to back wages for the period between his removal and retirement?

Whether the Executing Court could direct payment of back wages when such relief was not expressly granted in the High Court’s decree?

Whether the impugned order of the Executing Court travelled beyond the decree and was therefore liable to be set aside?

The Court applied the settled principle that an executing court must execute the decree as it stands and cannot go beyond, modify, explain, or substitute the decree.

This principle arises from the executing court’s limited jurisdiction under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which permits determination of questions relating to execution, discharge, or satisfaction of the decree but does not authorise adjudication beyond its terms.

The Court relied on Maurice W. Innis v. Lily Kazrooni @ Lily Arif Shaikh, SLP (C) No. 8166/2022, wherein the Supreme Court held that an executing court cannot assume the role of a trial court or substitute its own view for that expressed in the decree.

The Court also applied the principle that where the original decree has been reversed by the appellate court, the rights of the parties are governed by the operative appellate decree and not by the superseded decree.

The trial court had initially granted back wages, but its decree was reversed by the first appellate court.

In the second appeal, the High Court specifically considered the legality and proportionality of the respondent’s punishment and substituted removal with the punishment of placement at the lowest stage of the pay scale with cumulative effect.

The operative judgment did not contain any direction awarding back wages; instead, it granted monetary and service consequences only in accordance with the modified punishment.

Since the High Court had itself determined the appropriate punishment and consequential service treatment, the Executing Court could not infer or recreate an entitlement to back wages merely because the removal order had been quashed.

The respondent’s argument that the substantial question of law was confined to the validity of the punishment did not permit the Executing Court to revive the back-wage direction contained in the superseded trial-court decree.

Accordingly, the Executing Court’s direction for payment of back wages amounted to travelling beyond the decree, contrary to Section 47 CPC and the settled law governing execution proceedings.

The Executing Court lacked jurisdiction to award such wages or to rely on the superseded trial-court decree for that purpose.

The order dated 12 January 2024 directing payment of back wages was therefore quashed and set aside.

The writ petition was allowed to that extent; pending interlocutory applications were disposed of and no order as to costs was made.