An incumbent has no vested right to continue as HOD under a rotational administrative arrangement.

The petitioner, an Associate Professor in General Medicine, challenged the order dated 08.10.2026 assigning the Head of Department (HOD) charge to respondent No. 7.

She contended that she had been appointed earlier, was already serving as HOD, and that the assignment contravened the State’s instructions dated 05.08.2023.

She also relied on an earlier warning issued to respondent No. 7 and alleged financial irregularities during his prior tenure as HOD; she had submitted complaints in August 2026, but no inquiry had been conducted.

The petitioner further alleged that the timing of the impugned order was intended to defeat a pending writ petition and asserted that her disability and reserved-category status had not been fairly considered.

The State maintained that assignment of HOD charge was an administrative arrangement and that the petitioner had no vested right to continue in the role.

Whether the order dated 08.10.2026 assigning HOD charge to respondent No. 7 was unlawful or arbitrary so as to warrant interference under Article 226.

Whether the warning issued to respondent No. 7 or the allegations of financial irregularities required the impugned assignment to be set aside.

Whether the timing of the impugned order, or the petitioner’s disability and reserved-category status, established a ground for interference.

The State’s instructions dated 05.08.2023 provide for HOD appointments according to eligibility, seniority and rotation: ordinarily, the senior-most eligible Senior Professor/Professor is appointed for up to two years, followed by the next eligible person; clause 3 provides for consideration of the next eligible person where specified grounds—including adverse remarks by the Dean—apply, and clause 4 assigns appointment orders to the competent authorities.

An employee has no inherent or vested right to hold a particular current duty charge, and judicial review of administrative assignments is limited, including to cases involving breach of binding law, incompetence or mala fides.

Executive instructions do not, by themselves, ordinarily support a mandamus absent infringement of a statutory, fundamental or vested right.

A warning is not necessarily a formal penalty, but its substance and effect must be considered; separately, clause 3 of the 2023 instructions makes relevant whether adverse remarks of the contemplated kind were recorded.

The Court held that the petitioner’s earlier assignment as HOD did not create a continuing or exclusive right, since the 2023 instructions contemplate a rotational arrangement and the petitioner’s appointment order itself was for two years.

The warning to respondent No. 7 did not, on the material before the Court, establish that the impugned order was invalid; although clause 3 required consideration of qualifying adverse remarks, the petitioner had not shown a sufficient basis to quash the order on that ground.

The financial-irregularity allegations required examination by the competent authority and did not automatically invalidate the HOD assignment.

The timing of the order, without material establishing improper purpose or breach of a court direction, did not prove mala fides.

Disability and reserved-category status did not confer an automatic right to the charge, and no violation of rights on that basis was established.

It expressed no opinion on the merits of the financial-irregularity allegations, which the competent authority could consider if pursued in accordance with law; there was no order as to costs.