An independent title claimant is not a necessary or proper party to eviction proceedings.

Respondent No. 1 instituted S.C.C. Suit No. 49 of 2018 against Respondent No. 2 for eviction, recovery of arrears of rent and damages, claiming ownership and landladyship of the disputed shop under a sale deed dated 5 September 2017 and alleging default in rent.

The petitioner sought impleadment under Order I Rule 10 read with Section 151 CPC, asserting an independent title based on an earlier sale deed dated 19 June 2017 and alleging that the subsequent sale deed in favour of Respondent No. 1 had been procured by fraud and misrepresentation.

The petitioner had already instituted Original Suit No. 485 of 2018 seeking cancellation of the sale deed dated 5 September 2017.

Her impleadment application, Paper No. 81-Ga, was rejected by the Judge, Small Causes Court, on 6 February 2024 on the ground that her claim involved an independent title dispute beyond the scope of the S.C.C. proceedings.

The revisional court dismissed S.C.C. Revision No. 11 of 2024 on 2 May 2026 and affirmed that order.

The petitioner consequently invoked the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution.

Whether a person asserting an independent or competing title in the suit property is a necessary or proper party to an eviction suit before the Small Causes Court merely because that title is inconsistent with the title claimed by the plaintiff-landlord?

Whether the petitioner’s impleadment was necessary for effective adjudication of the landlord-tenant dispute, particularly when the petitioner’s title claim and challenge to the rival sale deed were already pending before a competent civil court?

Whether the orders refusing impleadment disclosed any jurisdictional error, perversity or material irregularity warranting interference under Article 227 of the Constitution?

The Court applied Order I Rule 10 CPC, under which a person may be added only if their presence is necessary for effective and complete adjudication of the questions involved in the suit; an independent interest in the property, by itself, does not satisfy this test.

A necessary party is one in whose absence no effective order can be made, whereas a proper party is one whose presence facilitates complete adjudication of the controversy actually before the court.

Relying on Kanaklata Das v. Naba Kumar Das, (2018) 2 SCC 352, the Court reiterated that in an eviction suit the landlord and tenant are ordinarily the necessary parties and a third person claiming independent title does not automatically become a necessary or proper party.

The Court further relied on Manish Bansal v. Jagdish Prasad Mittal, 2026 AHC:1681559, and Murti Markandeshwar Ji Maharaj Gopal Ki Bagiya City Jhansi v. Smt. Jyoti Gangwani, 2026 AHC:142875, for the principle that impleadment cannot be used to introduce an independent title dispute into limited-jurisdiction S.C.C. proceedings.

Section 23 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887, was considered in relation to cases where the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief depends upon a title question that the Small Causes Court cannot finally determine; however, the mere assertion of an independent title by a third party does not automatically attract Section 23.

The scope of review under Article 227 was confined to correcting jurisdictional error, perversity, manifest illegality or material irregularity.

The petitioner’s proposed participation was not limited to assisting the court in deciding whether Respondent No. 1 had established the landlord-tenant relationship, rent default and grounds for eviction.

Her case required adjudication of the validity, execution and legal effect of two rival sale deeds, together with allegations of fraud and misrepresentation—issues already pending in her independent civil suit.

Such questions were not foundational to the relief claimed by Respondent No. 1 against Respondent No. 2 and could not be introduced through an impleadment application before the Small Causes Court.

The Court distinguished incidental consideration of title from final adjudication of title and held that the S.C.C. suit was not shown to depend upon a final determination of the petitioner’s ownership claim so as to require application of Section 23.

The petitioner’s reliance on Respondent No. 2’s alleged denial of Respondent No. 1’s landladyship was also rejected because the revisional court had found, on the pleadings including amended paragraph 15-A of the written statement, that Respondent No. 2 had accepted Respondent No. 1 as landlady and had stated that rent was being deposited in her favour.

Even a tenant’s reference to a third person’s title would not make that third person a necessary or proper party, as that would permit the defence to enlarge the scope of eviction proceedings.

The petitioner’s apprehension of prejudice to her independent rights was insufficient justification for impleadment, since those rights remained open for adjudication in the pending civil suit.

Her impleadment would improperly introduce a separate title dispute involving rival sale deeds and allegations of fraud, which was outside the controversy requiring determination by the Small Causes Court.

No jurisdictional error, perversity, manifest illegality or material irregularity was found in the orders of the courts below.

The petition under Article 227 was accordingly dismissed, with no order as to costs.

The Court clarified that it had expressed no opinion on the validity or legal effect of either sale deed or on the petitioner’s allegations of fraud, and that the pending civil suit was to be decided independently and uninfluenced by the judgment.