An unproved oral family settlement cannot defeat a possession decree based on admitted ownership.

The petitioners sued for relief concerning the first floor of property No. 187, Sainik Vihar, Pitampura, alleging that it had been purchased in 2000 in petitioner no. 2’s name and that the respondent occupied it with their permission.

After the petitioners asked him to vacate, they issued notices in 2019, which went unanswered.

The respondent relied on an alleged oral family settlement dated 15 April 2001, under which he claimed a right to the first floor, and had separately sued for a declaration of ownership and specific performance of that settlement.

The Trial Court rejected the petitioners’ application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC. The petitioners challenged that order in revision.

1. Whether the Trial Court materially irregularly exercised its jurisdiction by refusing judgment under Order XII Rule 6 CPC despite the respondent’s alleged admissions concerning the petitioners’ ownership.

2. Whether the respondent’s reliance on an alleged oral family settlement and pending suit for specific performance prevented a decree for possession in the petitioners’ favour.

Order XII Rule 6 CPC permits, but does not require, judgment on clear, categorical and unambiguous admissions; the court must exercise discretion judicially because such a judgment is made without trial (Himani Alloys Ltd. v. Tata Steel Ltd., (2011) 15 SCC 273; S.M. Asif v. Virender Kumar Bajaj, (2015) 9 SCC 287; Karan Kapoor v. Madhuri Kumar, (2022) 10 SCC 496).

Revisional jurisdiction is limited to material irregularity or non-consideration of material evidence, and does not ordinarily permit reappreciation of evidence.

The Court also relied on the principle that an agreement or claim for specific performance does not, before conveyance, itself confer title or necessarily preserve a right to remain in possession (Sunil Kapoor v. Himmat Singh, 2010 SCC OnLine Del 354).

Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, was invoked for the rule that a licensee is estopped from denying the title of the person who permitted occupation.

The Court found that the respondent did not deny the petitioners’ 2000 title documents and had admitted that the first floor was purchased by them; the electricity bills, property-tax receipts and mutation record also supported their ownership.

The alleged 2001 settlement post-dated that acquisition and, even if assumed to exist, had not yet resulted in a transfer of title. The respondent’s separate suit seeking execution of a sale deed was consistent with his lack of present title, and no stay had been granted in that suit.

The Court considered the respondent’s possession, at most, permissive; the notices revoking that permission had not been answered. It therefore held that the alleged settlement and pending specific-performance suit did not bar the possession relief.

It remanded prayers (B), (C) and (D) to the Trial Court for determination on evidence.

The petition was disposed of, and pending applications were rendered infructuous.