An untimely specific-performance claim cannot sustain a dependent challenge to a subsequent sale deed.

The plaintiffs, being the wife and children of late C. Rajendra Naidu, claimed rights over the suit property on the basis of an alleged agreement of sale dated 20 December 1981, under which Defendant No.1 had allegedly agreed to sell the property to Rajendra Naidu for ₹26,000 and had delivered possession.

A General Power of Attorney was subsequently executed in favour of Rajendra Naidu on 5 March 1982.

The plaintiffs asserted that Rajendra Naidu constructed a house and remained in possession of the property.

Defendant No.1 later executed a registered sale deed dated 15 October 2007 in favour of Defendant No.2, who was Rajendra Naidu’s daughter and the plaintiffs’ sister.

The plaintiffs instituted the suit on 22 December 2009 seeking, inter alia, declaration that the 2007 sale deed was null and void and not binding on them, specific performance of the 1981 agreement, and permanent injunction.

Defendant No.2 applied under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, contending that the plaint disclosed no cause of action and that the claim for specific performance was barred by limitation.

The Trial Court allowed the application and rejected the plaint, holding that the suit was barred by limitation and that the plaint disclosed no cause of action.

The plaintiffs preferred the present Regular First Appeal under Section 96 read with Order XLI Rule 1 CPC.

Whether the plaintiffs’ claim for declaration that the sale deed dated 15 October 2007 was null and void and not binding on them disclosed a cause of action, when the claim was founded on the agreement of sale dated 20 December 1981?

Whether the suit seeking specific performance of the agreement of sale dated 20 December 1981 was barred by limitation under Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963?

Whether the execution of the sale deed dated 15 October 2007 constituted the first refusal by Defendant No.1 so as to attract the second limb of Article 54 and save the suit from limitation?

Whether the Trial Court’s order rejecting the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) CPC required interference?

The Court applied Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) CPC, under which a plaint may be rejected where it does not disclose a cause of action or where the suit, from the statements in the plaint itself, appears to be barred by law.

The Court reiterated that the plaint must be read as a whole and its averments must be accepted as true at the threshold; however, a plaint may be rejected where meaningful reading shows that the claim is manifestly vexatious, illusory, or legally barred, relying on Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali and the principles in T. Arivandandam, Liverpool & London S.P. & I Assn. Ltd., and Hardesh Ores (P) Ltd.

Under Article 54 of the Limitation Act, a suit for specific performance must be filed within three years from the date fixed for performance, or, where no date is fixed, from the date when the plaintiff has notice of refusal; the Court held that the right to sue cannot be postponed indefinitely merely because no date for performance was specified.

Article 59, relating to cancellation or setting aside of an instrument, could not independently sustain the declaratory relief where that relief was founded on a time-barred claim for specific performance.

The Court also applied the settled rule that an agreement of sale does not itself create title or interest in immovable property, and that a General Power of Attorney is an instrument of agency and does not transfer ownership, relying on Ramesh Chand v. Suresh Chand and the principles in Suraj Lamp.

A plaint must ordinarily be rejected as a whole or not at all under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.

The Court found that the entire plaintiffs’ case rested on the alleged 1981 agreement of sale, yet the suit was filed approximately 28 years after that agreement.

The plaint did not disclose any material steps taken by Rajendra Naidu or the plaintiffs during that period to demand execution of the sale deed, nor did it adequately plead readiness and willingness to perform their contractual obligations.

The Court rejected the argument that the 2007 sale deed constituted the first refusal and thereby commenced a fresh period under the second limb of Article 54.

It held that the plaintiffs could not remain inactive for decades and then rely on a subsequent sale transaction to revive an otherwise stale claim for specific performance.

The GPA did not improve the plaintiffs’ position because it neither transferred title nor independently established ownership in Rajendra Naidu.

Since the relief seeking declaration against the 2007 sale deed was expressly dependent upon obtaining specific performance of the 1981 agreement, the time-barred nature of the specific-performance claim destroyed the foundation of the declaratory relief as well.

Accordingly, the plaint disclosed no maintainable cause of action and was liable to rejection under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) CPC.

It held that the claim for specific performance based on the agreement dated 20 December 1981 was hopelessly barred by limitation under Article 54, notwithstanding the absence of a fixed date for performance.

The challenge to the 2007 sale deed could not survive independently because it was founded on the time-barred claim for specific performance; the GPA also conferred no title on the plaintiffs.

The Trial Court’s order rejecting the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) CPC was upheld, and the Regular First Appeal was dismissed.