Anticipatory bail granted where documentary evidence of alleged cheating appears prima facie suspicious and lacks corroboration.

The petitioner sought anticipatory bail regarding FIR No. 387/2024 (PS Geeta Colony) registered under Sections 406, 420, 120B, and 34 of the IPC.

The complainant alleged that the petitioner and an associate, Lalit Jain, induced him to invest Rs. 2 crores in M/s Clean Earth Innovations Pvt. Ltd. in exchange for a 2% shareholding.

The complainant claimed to have paid approximately Rs. 95.35 lakhs in cash over three installments against receipts issued by the accused, but the shares were never transferred nor was the money returned.

The petitioner asserted that the case was fabricated, he never issued receipts, and he had already joined the investigation and provided specimen signatures during the period of interim protection.

1. Whether the petitioner is entitled to the grant of anticipatory bail based on his cooperation with the investigation and the nature of the evidence presented by the prosecution.

Sections 406 (Criminal breach of trust), 420 (Cheating), 120B (Criminal conspiracy), and 34 (Common intention) of the Indian Penal Code.

The court applied the settled principles of anticipatory bail, weighing the necessity of custodial interrogation against the prima facie merits of the allegations and the petitioner's willingness to join the investigation.

The court noted that the petitioner had consistently joined the investigation and that his specimen signatures were already in the possession of the Investigating Officer (IO) for forensic comparison.

Upon examining the alleged cash receipts, the court found them prima facie suspicious; the documents were silent regarding the purchase of shares and contained "unusual space" between the printed letterhead material and the signatures.

The court further observed a lack of evidence regarding the source of the complainant's cash, specifically the absence of bank withdrawal records for the alleged payments.

While the State pointed out that the petitioner was not a Director of the company at the time of the first installment, the court determined that the existing material was not of such a nature to warrant the deprivation of the petitioner's liberty.

The court clarified that the trial court must take an independent view of the merits during the final trial stage based on the evidence adduced.

All pending applications were disposed of accordingly.