APAR downgrading by a Reviewing Officer without specific reasons is unsustainable and requires reconsideration.

The petitioner, a Superintending Engineer (Civil) in the Border Roads Organisation, challenged the downgrading of his APAR for the period 04.09.2022–31.03.2023 by the Reviewing Officer from the Reporting Officer’s grade of 7.0 to 5.9.

The petitioner also challenged the respondents’ declaration that his APAR/self-appraisal for 01.04.2023–31.03.2024 was “technically invalid,” asserting that the Reporting Officer was required to initiate the APAR if the self-appraisal was not submitted in time.

The respondents defended the delay and the impugned actions, disputed the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, and contended that the APAR timelines were directory.

During the proceedings, the Court also noted that the petitioner’s disciplinary chargesheet had been quashed in earlier proceedings and that the sealed-cover process concerning his promotion had subsequently been opened, with the petitioner being found unfit for promotion.

1. Whether the Reviewing Officer’s reduction of the petitioner’s APAR grading from 7.0 to 5.9, without specific and cogent reasons for differing from the Reporting Officer, was legally sustainable.

2. Whether the respondents could declare the petitioner’s APAR for 01.04.2023–31.03.2024 “technically invalid” without identifying an applicable statutory or administrative provision, and whether the petitioner’s self-appraisal was required to be considered under the DoPT procedure.

3. Whether the High Court of Meghalaya had territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition.

4. Whether the petitioner was entitled to consequential consideration of his service benefits, including promotion, following reconsideration of the APARs.

The Court applied the DoPT APAR framework, particularly the principle under the DoPT Office Memorandum dated 23.07.2009 that a Reviewing Officer differing from the Reporting Officer must specifically indicate the differences and the reasons for them.

It applied the broader principle that an APAR is intended to provide a fair and objective assessment and must not be used as an instrument of punishment or adverse action.

Under Clause 5.1 of the DoPT APAR guidelines, where an officer fails to submit a self-appraisal, the Reporting Officer is required to initiate the APAR.

The respondents relied on State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava, AIR 1957 SC 912, regarding directory timelines, and the petitioner relied on Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar v. Union of India, (1999) 7 SCC 409, concerning quasi-judicial functions; however, the Court disposed of the matter primarily on the narrower procedural grounds concerning reasoned APAR assessment and compliance with the DoPT mechanism.

The Court held that the Reporting Officer had directly supervised the petitioner and had assessed him at 7.0, whereas the Reviewing Officer reduced the grade to 5.9 merely stating that the petitioner had been “over-assessed,” without disclosing any cogent or specific basis for the substantial departure.

Such a bare disagreement did not satisfy the DoPT requirement that differences with the Reporting Officer’s assessment and the reasons for those differences be recorded.

In view of the adverse qualitative remarks and the impact of the downgrade on promotion, the Court found that the impugned entries could not operate against the petitioner without fresh, procedurally compliant consideration.

However, the Court declined to direct automatic restoration of the 7.0 grade, leaving the competent authority to undertake an independent reconsideration based on the permissible material.

Regarding the 2023–24 APAR, the Court found the petitioner’s case arguable because Clause 5.1 required the Reporting Officer to initiate the APAR where the self-appraisal was not submitted.

The expression “technically invalid” could not, by itself, deprive the petitioner of consideration unless supported by a specific governing provision; the respondents were therefore required to examine the self-appraisal and determine whether a valid APAR, a No Report Certificate, or another permissible course was appropriate.

The objection to territorial jurisdiction was rejected because it had not been raised in the earlier round of litigation and the continuing effect of the service-record decisions constituted a relevant connection with the jurisdiction.

The adverse remarks and the downgraded grading of 5.9 in the petitioner’s APAR for 04.09.2022–31.03.2023 were set aside.

The respondents were directed to reconsider that APAR under the applicable DoPT instructions, through a competent and unconnected officer, with specific and cogent reasons for any departure from the Reporting Officer’s assessment.

The respondents were further directed to reconsider the petitioner’s APAR/self-appraisal for 01.04.2023–31.03.2024 and not reject it merely as “technically invalid”; they were to determine whether a valid APAR, No Report Certificate, or another permissible course applied.

The exercise was to be completed within six weeks of receipt of the certified order, after which the petitioner’s consequential service benefits, including promotion if otherwise due, were to be reconsidered in accordance with law.

The Court expressly clarified that it had not adjudicated the petitioner’s entitlement to promotion on merits.

No order as to costs was made.