Appeal under Section 19(1) of Contempt of Courts Act is maintainable only against an order imposing punishment.

The appellant, Secretary of Digambar Jain College, was involved in a dispute regarding the selection of Assistant Professors. Following various rounds of litigation and government orders (some recalled and others set aside), the High Court on July 25, 2025, stayed an order dated April 21, 2025, which had allowed the selection process to proceed

The appellant allegedly issued appointment letters on July 26, 2025, asserting ignorance of the stay order till August 5, 2025

Respondent No. 1 filed a contempt petition (Contempt Application No. 6614 of 2025). On February 18, 2026, the Contempt Court directed the appellant and other officials to appear personally on March 30, 2026, to explain why charges should not be framed

The appellant challenged this intermediate order through the present Contempt Appeal under Section 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

1. Whether an appeal under Section 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, is maintainable against an intermediate order directing personal appearance to explain why charges should not be framed

The court primarily applied Section 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, which provides that an appeal lies as of right from "any order or decision" of the High Court passed in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt

It relied on the seminal principles established in Midnapore Peoples' Co-op. Bank Ltd. v. Chunilal Nanda (2006) 5 SCC 399, which clarified that an appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order imposing punishment, and not against orders initiating proceedings or procedural directives

The court also distinguished R.N. Dey v. Bhagyabati Pramanik (2000) 4 SCC 400, noting that appeals against intermediate orders are only permissible if they decide a "bone of contention" or substantive rights of the parties

The Court analyzed whether the impugned order dated February 18, 2026, constituted a "decision" in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish. While the appellant argued that intermediate orders are appealable if they affect the rights of the party, the Court observed that the Contempt Court had not yet framed charges nor imposed any punishment

Applying the Midnapore guidelines, the Court reasoned that the directive for personal appearance to explain why charges should not be framed was a procedural step, not a definitive action to penalize the contemnor

The Court found that no substantive right of the appellant had been adjudicated upon or restricted at this stage

The Court further clarified that the facts of R.N. Dey were distinct because that case involved a refusal to discharge a rule even after an apology was accepted, whereas here, the proceedings were merely at an initiatory stage

The Court dismissed the appeal, noting that the appellant is not remediless and may resort to filing an appeal under the Letters Patent Act if applicable