Appeals concerning goods imported as baggage lie outside the Tribunal’s jurisdiction under Section 129A.

The appellant arrived at Hyderabad airport from Kuala Lumpur carrying three 24-carat gold chains weighing 285 grams, which Customs alleged he had failed to declare.

The Commissioner (Appeals) reduced the penalty from ₹4,60,000 to ₹2,30,000 while maintaining the confiscation order. The appellant appealed to the CESTAT.

The Revenue objected that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction because the dispute concerned goods imported as baggage; the appellant relied on Vicky Ramchand Asrani to argue that jewellery recovered from a passenger’s person was not baggage for this purpose.

1. Whether the appeal concerned goods imported as baggage and was therefore excluded from the CESTAT’s appellate jurisdiction under the first proviso to Section 129A(1) of the Customs Act, 1962.

2. Whether recovery of the gold chains from the appellant’s person, rather than from checked-in baggage, took the case outside that exclusion.

The first proviso to Section 129A(1) of the Customs Act, 1962 excludes the CESTAT’s jurisdiction over appeals against orders of the Commissioner (Appeals) relating to goods imported or exported as baggage. Section 129DD provides the revisional remedy before the Central Government for orders falling within that exclusion.

In Commissioner of Customs (Airport) v. Ahamed Gani Natchiar, the Madras High Court applied the baggage exclusion to gold jewellery recovered from an international passenger and held that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction, while allowing recourse to revision.

The Tribunal also relied on Mohamed Mansoor – Mahabubunissa, Shri Abdul Raheem Kaulani, Shri Mohd Dosri, and Mohd Asif Uddin, which applied the jurisdictional bar to baggage-related disputes.

The Tribunal treated the character of the dispute as determined by the goods’ connection to the appellant’s arrival in India as an international passenger, not by where on his person or among his belongings the gold was found.

Whether the chains were in a trouser pocket or checked-in baggage, intended for personal use, deliberately concealed, or supported by an invoice concerned the merits of confiscation and did not alter the appellate forum.

It followed the approach in Ahamed Gani Natchiar and the later Tribunal decisions, and distinguished Vicky Ramchand Asrani as adopting a restrictive interpretation of “baggage”.

It sustained the Revenue’s preliminary objection, directed the Registry to return the appeal papers after retaining the required copies so the appellant could pursue revision under Section 129DD, and disposed of the appeal accordingly.