### Appellate Court cannot confirm conviction and remit matter to Trial Court for sentencing alone.

The complainant filed a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments (NI) Act, alleging that the accused issued a cheque for ₹1,50,000/- for labour supplied for tower construction, which was dishonoured due to "insufficient funds".

The Trial Court convicted the accused, sentencing him to one year of imprisonment and a fine of ₹2,30,000/-.

On appeal, the Sessions Judge (Appellate Court) upheld the conviction but set aside the sentence, remitting the matter to the Trial Court to pass a new sentence of fine, reasoning that the Magistrate's power to fine was limited to ₹10,000/- under Section 29 of the Cr.P.C.

Notably, the Appellate Court failed to decide an application for additional evidence filed by the accused under Section 391 of the Cr.P.C.

1. Whether an Appellate Court has the jurisdiction to confirm a conviction while remitting the case to the Trial Court solely for the purpose of sentencing.

2. Whether the Appellate Court can dispose of an appeal without adjudicating a pending application for additional evidence under Section 391 of the Cr.P.C.

3. Whether the sentencing powers of a Judicial Magistrate in Section 138 NI Act cases are restricted by the limits prescribed in Section 29 of the Cr.P.C.

The Court applied Section 386(b) of the Cr.P.C., which defines the powers of the Appellate Court in appeals from conviction, emphasizing that it does not permit a remand for sentencing alone while maintaining conviction.

Relying on Jatinder Singh v. Mehar Singh, the court applied the principle that failure to decide an application for additional evidence before pronouncing a final judgment is a jurisdictional error.

Furthermore, the court applied Section 143 of the NI Act, which overrides Section 29 of the Cr.P.C., as interpreted in R. Vijayan v. Baby, removing the ceiling on fines for First Class Magistrates in cheque dishonour cases (allowing fines up to twice the cheque amount).

The High Court observed that the Appellate Court's order was legally flawed on three counts.

First, under Section 386(b) Cr.P.C., an Appellate Court must either maintain, reverse, or alter the sentence itself; it cannot "split" the judgment by confirming conviction and remanding the sentence, as this power is not contemplated by the Code.

Second, the Court noted that the accused had filed an application under Section 391 Cr.P.C. for additional evidence, which the Appellate Court acknowledged but failed to dispose of.

The High Court reasoned that ignoring such an application results in a miscarriage of justice and a refusal to exercise vested jurisdiction.

Finally, the High Court found the Appellate Court's understanding of sentencing limits erroneous; Section 143 of the NI Act (a special statute) empowers a Magistrate to impose a fine exceeding the ₹10,000 limit of Section 29 Cr.P.C., specifically up to double the cheque amount.

The Court held that the Appellate Court's remand for sentencing was unauthorized and its failure to decide the Section 391 application was a patent defect.

The matter was remitted to the Sessions Judge with directions to first decide the application for additional evidence and thereafter dispose of the appeal in its entirety according to law.

Parties were directed to appear before the Appellate Court on 24.03.2026.