Appellate court cannot interfere with acquittal where trial court adopts a reasonable, non-perverse view.

The complainant, Smt. Kabila Bai, alleged that on November 15, 2010, the accused, Harinarayan Tiwari, assaulted her with a bamboo stick and hurled caste-based abuses.

The prosecution alleged offences under Sections 294, 323, 506 Part-II of the IPC and Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST (POA) Act.

The accused pleaded not guilty, claiming the report was a counter-blast to an earlier incident where the complainant and her husband had beaten him.

The Trial Court acquitted the accused on November 16, 2025, citing a failure to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt.

Both the complainant and the State appealed the acquittal.

Whether the prosecution proved the charges of assault, criminal intimidation, and caste-based atrocities beyond reasonable doubt despite material contradictions in the testimony.

Whether the non-explanation/suppression of injuries sustained by the accused in the same incident is fatal to the prosecution's case.

Whether the appellate court should interfere with a judgment of acquittal where the Trial Court’s view is a "possible view".

The court applied Sections 294 (obscene acts), 323 (voluntarily causing hurt), and 506 Part-II (criminal intimidation) of the Indian Penal Code, alongside Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act.

The court relied on the precedent of Lakshmi Singh and Others v. State of Bihar (AIR 1976 SC 2263) regarding the effect of the prosecution's failure to explain injuries on the accused.

The court further applied the principles of appellate review of acquittals as established in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka (2023), Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka (2024), and Sadhu Saran Singh v. State of U.P. (2016), which mandate that an acquittal should not be disturbed unless perverse or based on misreading of evidence.

While the complainant claimed the assault occurred inside her gate, the spot map and FIR placed the incident outside, indicating a material change in the location.

Crucially, the prosecution witnesses suppressed the fact that a cross-FIR had been filed against them and that the accused had also sustained a nose injury during the same scuffle; following Lakshmi Singh, the Court held that such suppression makes the prosecution's version unreliable.

The court noted that independent witnesses did not corroborate the specific elements of obscenity (Sec 294) or criminal intimidation (Sec 506).

Since the Trial Court's view was based on a reasonable appreciation of these inconsistencies, it did not meet the threshold of "perversity" required for an appellate court to overturn an acquittal.

The High Court dismissed both appeals and affirmed the judgment of acquittal, reiterating that when two views are possible, the view favourable to the accused must be adopted and the findings of the Trial Court were found to be neither illegal nor perverse.