Appellate Court cannot substitute its discretion for Trial Court's unless the order is palpably perverse.

The respondent (plaintiff) filed a suit for the cancellation of a Family Settlement Deed and a Will dated 15.02.2019 executed by his mother (Petitioner/Defendant No. 1) in favour of his brother (Defendant No. 2)

The plaintiff contended that his late father’s Will dated 13.11.2018 granted the mother only a limited life estate without the right of alienation

The Trial Court dismissed the injunction application on 20.01.2024, finding no prima facie case

On appeal, the First Appellate Court (District Judge, Kangra) reversed this on 02.06.2025 and restrained the defendants from alienating the land

The petitioners challenged this reversal before the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution

1. Whether the First Appellate Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Order 43 Rule 1 of the CPC by substituting its own discretion for that of the Trial Court without a finding of perversity

2. Whether a suit for cancellation of a Will is maintainable during the lifetime of the testator

The Court applied Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 (Temporary Injunctions) and Order 43 Rule 1 (Appeals from Orders) of the CPC.

The doctrine established in Wander Ltd. v. Antox India P. Ltd. (reiterated in Ramakant Ambalal Choksi v. Harish Ambalal Choksi, 2024 INSC 913), which mandates that an appellate court shall not interfere with the trial court’s exercise of discretion unless it is shown to be arbitrary, capricious, or perverse

The Court also referenced Arulvelu v. State regarding the definition of "perverse" findings as those being against the weight of evidence or defying logic

The principle that a Will only takes effect after the death of the testator

The High Court observed that the First Appellate Court acted as a trial court by conducting a de novo consideration of the facts instead of merely reviewing the validity of the Trial Court's discretionary order

The Court noted that the First Appellate Court erred by prematurely interpreting the clauses of the father's Will—a task reserved for the final adjudication of the suit

The High Court found that the plaintiff’s challenge to the mother’s Will dated 15.02.2019 was legally premature because she is still alive, and a Will confers no rights until the testator's death

The Trial Court’s refusal to grant an injunction was a "possible view" and did not suffer from perversity, meaning the Appellate Court had no grounds to interfere

The Court held that the First Appellate Court exceeded its jurisdiction by substituting its discretion without recording a finding of perversity in the Trial Court's order

It further held that a suit challenging a Will during the lifetime of the executor is not maintainable, thus precluding a prima facie case for injunction

The parties were directed to proceed with the trial without being influenced by these observations