Appellate Court possesses inherent power to recall orders passed under procedural misconception despite absence of express review jurisdiction.

The respondent-landlord filed a release application under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 for a shop in Jhansi

The Prescribed Authority allowed the release on 29.10.2018

On appeal (Rent Control Appeal No. 30 of 2018), the appellate court set aside the order on 16.10.2025, holding the application non-maintainable due to lack of a mandatory six-month notice

The landlord moved a review application, pointing out that the property was purchased via a sale deed in 1963—prior to the Act's 1972 commencement—meaning the statutory notice embargo did not apply

On 19.12.2025, the appellate court allowed the review, recalled its earlier judgment, and ordered a rehearing

The petitioners (tenants) challenged this recall order as an unauthorized exercise of substantive review

The Court applied Section 34(1)(g) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 and Rule 22(f) of the 1972 Rules, which vest the authority with inherent powers analogous to Sections 151 and 152 of the CPC to ensure the ends of justice and prevent abuse of process

It relied on the doctrine from Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji, stating substantive review is not an inherent power and must be conferred by statute

It followed Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal, distinguishing between "substantive review" (re-adjudication of merits) and "procedural review" (inherent power to set aside palpably erroneous orders passed under misapprehension)

The Court also invoked the maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit (an act of the court shall prejudice no man)

The Court noted that Rule 22(f) specifically incorporates Section 151 CPC, acknowledging a limited inherent jurisdiction

The Court reasoned that the appellate court’s initial decision (16.10.2025) contained a foundational misconception: it acknowledged the 1963 sale deed on record but erroneously applied a statutory notice requirement that only triggers for properties purchased after the 1972 Act

The High Court observed that the review court did not reassess "bona fide need" or "hardship" (merits), but merely corrected a "patent error" arising from a misapprehension of the existing record

It formulated ten tests to distinguish the two types of review, concluding that since the order corrected a "decision-making process" vitiated by the court's own inadvertence rather than substituting one subjective view for another, it fell under "procedural review"

The authority has an inherent duty to correct orders that are palpably erroneous due to the court's own misconception ex debito justitiae

The High Court dismissed the petition, refusing to interfere under Article 227 as the restoration of the appeal for rehearing caused no irreversible prejudice and ensured adjudication in accordance with law