Appellate courts should not disturb acquittals where the trial court’s view is plausible.

The State sought leave under Section 378(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure to appeal the J.M.F.C., Churhat’s judgment dated 23 May 2019 acquitting the respondents of offences under Sections 294, 323 (alternatively, Section 323 read with Section 34), 325 (alternatively, Section 325 read with Section 34), and 506-II of the IPC

The prosecution alleged that, following a land dispute, the respondents abused and assaulted Ashok Vishwakarma, causing injuries; the State contended that his testimony was corroborated by medical evidence

The High Court considered the trial court’s reasoning and the evidence on record

Whether the trial court’s acquittal was so perverse, legally flawed, or unsupported by the evidence as to warrant appellate interference

Whether the State had established grounds for leave to appeal against the acquittal under Section 378(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure

Section 378(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires leave of the High Court before an appeal against an acquittal may proceed

In an appeal against acquittal, the presumption of innocence is strengthened by the acquittal; where the trial court has adopted a possible and plausible view based on the evidence, an appellate court should not interfere merely because another view is possible. Interference may be warranted where the acquittal suffers from material illegality, perversity, or misreading of evidence

The High Court independently examined the trial court’s findings and concluded that the trial court had considered the prosecution evidence and given cogent, plausible reasons for acquittal

It found no manifest illegality, perversity, or misreading of material evidence, and held that the trial court’s view was reasonable and legally sustainable

The State had therefore not shown a compelling circumstance or substantial infirmity warranting appellate interference

The application was dismissed as devoid of merit