Appellate Interference In Sentence Warranted Where Long Pendency And Non-Examination Of Material Witnesses Prejudiced Defence

On November 28, 1994, the appellants, armed with lathis, swords, and spears, were found by the informant ploughing his field.

When the informant protested, appellant Rupan Mian inflicted a sword blow on his head, while others assaulted him with an iron rod and lathis, resulting in a fractured hand and multiple head injuries to the informant and his cousin.

Bengabad P.S. Case No. 118/1994 was registered under Sections 147, 148, 149, 323, 324, 325, 326, and 307 of the IPC.

The Trial Court (Additional Sessions Judge, FTC-IX, Giridih), vide judgment dated May 29, 2009, convicted the five appellants under Sections 147, 148, and 323/34 of the IPC and sentenced them to maximum rigorous imprisonment of two years.

1. Whether the conviction of the appellants under Sections 147, 148, and 323/34 of the IPC is sustainable despite the non-examination of the Investigating Officer and the Doctor.

2. Whether the sentence of two years rigorous imprisonment should be modified considering the lapse of 30 years since the occurrence and the period already undergone in custody.

The Court applied the Indian Penal Code (IPC), specifically Section 147 (punishment for rioting), Section 148 (rioting, armed with deadly weapon), and Section 323 read with Section 34 (voluntarily causing hurt with common intention).

The Court exercised its appellate discretion regarding sentencing, weighing the nature of the offense against factors such as the age and antecedents of the accused, and the principle of judicial economy and justice in cases of long-pending litigation.

The Court evaluated the oral testimony of the six prosecution witnesses alongside the written report (Exbt-1) and injury reports (Exbt-2 & 3).

Although the appellants argued that the non-examination of the Investigating Officer and the Doctor caused prejudice and left a gap in medical evidence, the Court found the ocular evidence and available documents sufficient to uphold the conviction.

Regarding the quantum of sentence, the Court noted that the occurrence dated back to 1994, meaning over 30 years had elapsed and that the appellants had already remained in custody for approximately three months during the trial.

Given the significant passage of time and the nature of the specific convictions (Sections 147, 148, 323/34 IPC), the Court determined that the interests of justice would be served by modifying the sentence to the period already undergone.

It modified the order of sentence dated June 5, 2009, reducing the term of imprisonment for all appellants to the period already undergone (approximately three months) in lieu of the original two-year sentence, and discharged the appellants from the liability of their bail bonds.