Application challenging policy after twelve years and bypassing internal redressal mechanisms is not maintainable.

The applicant, Dr. Sushree Swarupa Tripathy, a Senior Principal Scientist at National Physical Laboratory (NPL) since 2007, was appointed Head of the Chemical and Food Section (Division 5.03) on October 29, 2020.

Having an outstanding performance record and receiving an accelerated merit-based promotion in 2024, she was reverted from her headship and placed under the direct supervision of Respondent No. 6, a junior, less qualified, and less experienced Principal Scientist, via an Office Memorandum (O.M.) dated April 30, 2025.

This O.M., along with Circular No. 4-38/2002-E-II(PD) dated March 7, 2013, which mandates the rotation of headship, is challenged by the applicant.

The applicant claims the actions are arbitrary, punitive, vindictive, and a violation of principles of natural justice, citing her domain expertise and superior merit/seniority.

The respondents contended that the O.M. is a routine functional arrangement based on long-standing CSIR policies and that the OA is not maintainable due to inordinate delay in challenging the 2013 Circular (12 years) and non-exhaustion of internal grievance redressal mechanisms.

They further argued that headship is a functional assignment, not a vested right or promotional post, and the applicant's substantive rank, pay, and seniority remain unaffected.

1. Whether the Original Application is barred by limitation under Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, insofar as it challenges Circular dated March 7, 2013?

2. Whether the applicant has exhausted the alternative remedy as enumerated under Section 20 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985?

3. Whether withdrawal/rotation of functional headship amounts to a civil consequence or reduction in rank?

4. Whether executive circular dated March 7, 2013, can validly regulate rotational headship without violating Recruitment Rules?

5. Whether alleged violation of seniority principle renders the administrative decision illegal?

6. Whether absence of show cause notice vitiates the impugned action?

The tribunal applied Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, which mandates a one-year limitation period for applications.

Section 20 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, requiring the exhaustion of available departmental remedies before approaching the tribunal.

The Supreme Court's ruling in *D.C.S. Negi v. Union of India, (2018) 16 SCC 721*, emphasizing that statutory time limits are mandatory and non-compliance renders an application incompetent, even if the objection is not raised by the respondent.

The principle that stale claims cannot be revived was drawn from *Union of India v. M.K. Sarkar, 2010 (2) SCC 59*.

For the requirement of exhausting alternative remedies, *S.S. Rathore v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1989) 4 SCC 582*, was referenced, stating that the cause of action arises only after departmental remedies are disposed of.

The Supreme Court's decision in *Union of India v. T.R. Varma, 1957 AIR SUPREME COURT 882*, reinforced that parties should ordinarily exhaust available statutory remedies before invoking the special jurisdiction of the High Court or Tribunal.

Regarding administrative discretion and arbitrariness, the Constitutional Bench decision in *E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1974) 4 SCC 3*, clarified that administrative discretion is permissible if not arbitrary or mala fide, and that Articles 14 and 16 strike at arbitrariness in State action.

The tribunal referred to *Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel, (1985) 3 SCC 398*, to state that natural justice requirements depend on context, and rotation of functional duty may not require a pre-decisional hearing if no civil consequences occur.

The tribunal found the challenge to the 2013 Circular time-barred under Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, as it was made after more than twelve years without adequate explanation for delay, and the applicant had previously benefited from its provisions.

It also concluded that the OA was premature due to the applicant's failure to exhaust the internal grievance redressal mechanisms available within NPL, as mandated by Section 20 of the Act and precedents like *S.S. Rathore* and *T.R. Varma*.

The tribunal determined that the rotation of functional headship did not amount to a civil consequence or reduction in rank, as the applicant's substantive post, pay, seniority, and promotional avenues remained unaffected, distinguishing it from a demotion.

The 2013 Circular was held to be a valid administrative instruction regulating internal functioning and rotational headship, not overriding Recruitment Rules, which govern cadre hierarchy and promotions.

The tribunal concluded that the seniority principle was not violated in the context of rotational functional headship, as it's an internal allocation of duties, not a promotional post.

The respondents demonstrated that the rotation was part of an institutional policy applied uniformly, negating allegations of mala fides, consistent with *E.P. Royappa*.

Finally, the absence of a show cause notice did not vitiate the action, as no civil consequences (demotion, adverse entry, pay reduction) occurred, aligning with *Tulsiram Patel*, which clarifies that natural justice depends on context.

The tribunal held that the challenge to the 2013 Circular was barred by limitation due to inordinate delay.

It was further held that the OA was premature due to the non-exhaustion of statutory remedies.

The tribunal found no civil consequence or reduction in rank established, that the executive circular did not override Recruitment Rules, and that administrative discretion was exercised uniformly.

The court also found the reliance on *Vice Chancellor, L.N. Mithila University vs. Dayanand Jha* to be distinguishable and irrelevant.

No order as to costs was made.