Article 226 cannot resolve disputed contractual dues; courts may direct payment of admitted shortfalls with interest.

The petitioners—four firms belonging to the same family and village—supplied food packets for BRC-year training programmes conducted by Block Education Officers in District Bahraich during 2020–2023 pursuant to GeM orders. The petitioners claimed substantial unpaid dues supported by GeM orders, invoices and departmental reports. Payments were allegedly delayed because of failure or closure of the PFMS/PPA portal, non-availability of funds and the absence of a Single Nodal Account.

In an earlier writ petition, the Court directed the petitioner to submit a representation. The Director, Basic Education, thereafter passed an order dated 15 January 2025 admitting only part of the claimed dues. For example, in Writ-C No. 2146 of 2026, the petitioner claimed ₹35,02,521, whereas the department admitted ₹14,15,896.

During the pendency of the present proceedings, the respondents conducted a fresh Block-level verification and claimed to have released payments. In Writ-C No. 2146 of 2026, ₹37,94,906 was stated to have been released; however, in Writ-C Nos. 2151 and 2153 of 2026, the payments fell short of the amounts admitted in the impugned order by ₹10,45,791 and ₹1,19,544 respectively.

The petitioners sought payment of their higher claimed amounts with 18% interest and quashing of the order dated 15 January 2025 to the extent it reduced their dues. The respondents contended that the claims were disputed, that verified liabilities had been discharged, and that no amount remained payable.

1. Whether the High Court could exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 to adjudicate and direct payment of the petitioners’ higher, disputed contractual or quasi-contractual claims?

2. Whether the respondents were required to release the shortfalls that remained unpaid even according to the amounts admitted in the Director’s order dated 15 January 2025?

3. Whether the petitioners were entitled to interest on the admitted unpaid amounts or on the higher disputed claims?

4. Whether the petitioners should be relegated to a civil suit for adjudication of the disputed excess claims?

The Court applied Article 226 of the Constitution, recognising that although a writ petition involving contractual obligations and monetary relief may be maintainable in an appropriate case, the writ court ordinarily does not adjudicate seriously disputed questions of fact requiring oral and documentary evidence. Relying on State of U.P. v. Bridge & Roof Co. (India) Ltd., (1996) 6 SCC 22, and Kerala State Electricity Board v. Kurien E. Kalathil, (2000) 6 SCC 293, the Court held that disputed questions concerning the existence and quantification of contractual dues are ordinarily suited to a civil suit.

Under ABL International Ltd. v. ECGC, (2004) 3 SCC 553, the existence of disputed facts is not an absolute bar to writ jurisdiction, but the court may decline relief where the dispute is complex and requires evidence.

The Court also relied on State of Bihar v. Jain Plastics and Chemicals Ltd., (2002) 1 SCC 216, and Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, (1998) 8 SCC 1, concerning the limits and discretionary nature of writ jurisdiction.

M/s Utkal Highways Engineer and Contractors v. Chief General Manager, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1400, was applied for the principle that there is no absolute prohibition against directing payment of admitted dues in writ proceedings.

The principles in Secretary, Irrigation Department, Government of Orissa v. G.C. Roy, (1992) 1 SCC 508, and Dr. Poornima Advani v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2025) 7 SCC 269, were applied to hold that interest follows only after the principal amount due has been firmly established.

The Court also granted the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, if the petitioners instituted civil proceedings.

The Court distinguished between the respondents’ own admitted liability and the petitioners’ larger claims. The shortfalls of ₹10,45,791 in Writ-C No. 2151 of 2026 and ₹1,19,544 in Writ-C No. 2153 of 2026 were undisputed because those amounts had already been admitted in the Director’s order but remained unpaid; their release therefore required no fact-finding.

In contrast, the petitioners’ claims had changed substantially over time, while the respondents’ figures also varied after the fresh verification. The Court found that determining the correct amount would require scrutiny of GeM orders, invoices, work records, payment records and Block-level verification reports, possibly with oral evidence. This made the dispute one of complex fact and account, falling outside the ordinary scope of summary Article 226 jurisdiction.

The Court further held that the release of ₹37,94,906 to the petitioner in Writ-C No. 2146 of 2026 exceeded its original claim of ₹35,02,521, while the amounts released in some connected petitions were less than the figures admitted in the impugned order. This inconsistency demonstrated that the quantum could not be determined merely from affidavits. Accordingly, the Court directed payment only of the admitted shortfalls and declined to adjudicate the disputed excess claims.

Since interest is dependent upon an established principal liability, the claim for 18% interest on the higher disputed amounts could not be granted; interest was awarded only on the admitted shortfalls at 9% per annum from 15 January 2025.

No further payment was directed in Writ-C Nos. 2146, 2158 and 2240 of 2026 because the amounts released equalled or exceeded the amounts admitted in the impugned order; the respondents were left free to recover, adjust or set off any excess payment.

The prayers to quash the order dated 15 January 2025 and to compel payment of the higher disputed amounts were rejected. The petitioners were relegated to a competent civil court for adjudication of those claims, with liberty to lead evidence and the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, in accordance with law.

There was no order as to costs.