Article 226 courts cannot reappreciate concurrent factual findings absent perversity, illegality, or jurisdictional error.

Respondent No. 2, Sudhanshu Dutt, became a member of Mount Everest Cooperative Group Housing Society and deposited approximately Rs. 8,60,000/- towards the proposed allotment of a flat.

The Society accepted the withdrawal and agreed to refund the amount with interest at 7%, subject to replacement of the membership. It subsequently refunded Rs. 5,00,000/-, leaving a balance of Rs. 3,60,000/- unpaid.

A prior writ petition, W.P.(C) 6540/2007, was decided on 3 August 2010, in which the Court noted that the member had received only a partial refund and was therefore not allotted a flat.

Respondent No. 2 thereafter initiated proceedings under Sections 70 and 71 of the Delhi Cooperative Societies Act, 2003. The arbitrator awarded Rs. 3,60,000/- with 7% interest from 5 April 1999 until payment, along with arbitration fee and costs.

Whether the claim for refund of the unpaid amount was barred by limitation under the Delhi Cooperative Societies Act, 2003?

Whether the Delhi High Court, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 226, should interfere with concurrent factual findings of the arbitrator and the Delhi Cooperative Tribunal?

The Court applied Sections 70 and 71 of the Delhi Cooperative Societies Act, 2003, which provide the statutory mechanism for adjudication of disputes concerning cooperative societies and their members.

Under Article 226, the High Court does not reappreciate evidence or substitute its factual conclusions for those of the competent authorities unless there is jurisdictional error, perversity, illegality, or grave miscarriage of justice.

This principle was applied from Jagdish Singh Chauhan v. Lt. Governor of Delhi, 2025 SCC OnLine Del 8783, relying on Ajay Singh v. Kacheru, 2025:INSC:9, and the principles stated in Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Ashalata S. Guram and Krishnanand v. Director of Consolidation.

The Court held that the limitation objection lacked merit because Respondent No. 2 sought refund at the earliest stage, through his letter dated 9 September 2000, and the Society expressly accepted the withdrawal and subsequently made a substantial part-payment.

The continuing correspondence up to 2006, the Society’s acknowledgment of the refund liability, and the prior writ proceedings demonstrated that the claim had not been abandoned or rendered stale.

The DCT had examined the documentary record and reached a reasoned conclusion that the deposit, partial refund, and outstanding liability were undisputed.

Since those findings were neither perverse nor jurisdictionally defective, the High Court held that Article 226 could not be used to reappreciate the factual record or interfere with the concurrent findings of the arbitrator and the DCT.

The writ petition challenging the arbitral award and the DCT judgment was accordingly dismissed, and all pending applications were disposed of.