Article 227 jurisdiction cannot reappraise interim visitation arrangements absent patent perversity or jurisdictional error.

The petitioner-mother invoked Article 227 of the Constitution challenging the interim order dated 30 May 2026 passed by the Family Court, Central District, Tis Hazari Courts, in GP No. 77/2023.

The impugned order extended the respondent-father’s visitation period with the minor child from one hour to one and a half hours, permitted visitation on the first, third and fourth Saturdays between 3:00 p.m. and 4:30 p.m., and directed the petitioner to remain outside the Children Room during visitation, although within the same premises.

It also restrained both parties from video-recording the visitation, noting the availability of CCTV cameras.

During the proceedings, the petitioner admitted that she had consented to extending the visitation period to one and a half hours.

Whether the Family Court’s direction extending the visitation period from one hour to one and a half hours warranted interference under Article 227 of the Constitution, despite the petitioner’s admission that she had consented to the extension.

Whether the direction requiring the petitioner to remain outside the Children Room during the father’s visitation was contrary to the welfare and best interests of the minor child or otherwise suffered from jurisdictional error, perversity or manifest illegality.

Whether the petitioner was entitled to directions regarding maintenance arrears in the present proceedings.

Whether the restriction against video-recording the visitation required interference under Article 227.

The Court applied the limited supervisory scope of Article 227, holding that the High Court may interfere only to keep subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction and in cases of patent jurisdictional error, perversity, manifest illegality, gross failure of justice or violation of natural justice; it cannot function as an appellate court or merely substitute its own view (Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil, (2010) 8 SCC 329, and Garment Craft v. Prakash Chand Goel, (2022) 4 SCC 181).

In child-custody and visitation matters, the paramount consideration is the welfare and best interests of the child.

A child of tender years ordinarily requires the love, affection and company of both parents, and meaningful visitation should be ensured unless exceptional circumstances justify denial of contact (Yashita Sahu v. State of Rajasthan, (2020) 3 SCC 67).

Interim visitation arrangements may regulate the manner of parental interaction without finally determining either parent’s rights.

The Court held that the challenge to the extended visitation period could not be sustained because the petitioner had expressly consented to it.

The direction requiring her to remain outside the Children Room was viewed as a permissible regulation intended to facilitate direct interaction between the father and child, rather than as an exclusion of the petitioner from the premises.

The child’s tender age and possible crying during visitation were insufficient, by themselves, to establish that the arrangement was contrary to the child’s welfare; the Court considered that familiarity with the father might develop gradually and that the child’s welfare included preserving a meaningful relationship with both parents.

The presence of CCTV cameras and the petitioner’s continued presence within the premises provided safeguards against incidents during visitation.

Since the impugned order did not concern maintenance arrears, the Court declined to adjudicate that issue and left it open to the petitioner to approach the Family Court.

The Court found no patent illegality, perversity or jurisdictional infirmity in the visitation or recording-related directions.

The extension of visitation to one and a half hours remained operative; the petitioner was required to remain outside the Children Room but could stay within the same premises; and the prohibition on video-recording continued.

The issue of maintenance arrears was left open for determination by the Family Court in appropriate proceedings.

The petitioner was also permitted to seek modification before the Family Court if genuine difficulties arose or circumstances subsequently changed.