Article 311(2)(b) cannot be invoked on presumptions; cogent reasons must establish departmental inquiry impracticability.

The applicant, a Head Constable in the Delhi Police, was posted at IGI Airport Police Station.

Two passengers alleged that police personnel intercepted them after their arrival from abroad and forcibly took away gold carried by them.

On the basis of their statements, FIR No. 586/2022 was registered against the applicant and another Head Constable under Sections 384, 427, 34, 365 and 392 IPC and Sections 7 and 13(1)(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.

The applicant was arrested on 25 December 2022 and placed under suspension.

A preliminary enquiry was conducted, which recorded a prima facie finding of serious misconduct.

Relying on the FIR, the preliminary enquiry report, and an apprehension that witnesses might be threatened or influenced, the Disciplinary Authority invoked Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution and dismissed the applicant without holding a regular departmental enquiry on 30 December 2022.

The applicant’s statutory appeal was rejected on 28 August 2024.

Whether the Disciplinary Authority validly invoked Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution to dispense with a regular departmental enquiry on the basis of the gravity of the allegations and a general apprehension that witnesses might be influenced or threatened?

Whether the dismissal order and the appellate order were sustainable when they proceeded on the assumption that the allegations in the FIR and the preliminary enquiry stood proved without giving the applicant an opportunity of defence?

Whether the applicant was entitled to consequential benefits and whether the respondents could be permitted to initiate fresh disciplinary proceedings in accordance with law?

Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution permits dispensing with a departmental enquiry only where the competent authority is personally satisfied, on the basis of relevant material, that it is not reasonably practicable to hold such an enquiry; the satisfaction must be supported by specific, cogent and fact-based reasons, not by conjecture, the gravity of the charge, or a general presumption that witnesses may be intimidated.

The Tribunal relied on the principles laid down in Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel, which treats dispensing with an enquiry as an exceptional power, and on the Delhi Police circular dated 11 September 2007 requiring a speaking order supported by material showing threat, inducement, intimidation or similar circumstances making an enquiry impracticable.

It also followed the principles affirmed in Dushyant Kumar v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi, Commissioner of Police v. Manjeet, Commissioner of Police v. Jagmal Singh, Commissioner of Police v. Sant Ram, and Commissioner of Police v. Om Prakash, that seriousness of misconduct or the status of the delinquent as a police officer cannot, by itself, justify dispensing with the enquiry.

A preliminary enquiry is fact-finding in nature and cannot substitute the regular disciplinary enquiry or establish final guilt.

The Tribunal found that the Disciplinary Authority treated the allegations in the FIR and the preliminary enquiry report as if they conclusively established the applicant’s guilt, although the applicant had not been given an opportunity to defend himself in a regular departmental proceeding.

The reasons that witnesses might be intimidated or that the applicant occupied an influential position were unsupported by any specific evidence of threats, coercion, or attempted interference.

The Tribunal particularly noted that the applicant was a lower-ranking Head Constable, that several witnesses were official witnesses, and that both a preliminary enquiry and the criminal trial had been conducted, undermining the assertion that a departmental enquiry was impracticable.

The seriousness of the allegations and the need to preserve the image of the police force could justify disciplinary action if proved, but could not replace the procedural safeguard of an enquiry under Article 311(2).

The appellate authority also failed to independently address the applicant’s specific grounds and mechanically upheld the dismissal.

Accordingly, the dismissal order dated 30 December 2022 and the appellate order dated 28 August 2024 were quashed and set aside.

The applicant was held entitled to consequential benefits under the applicable rules, and the respondents were directed to implement the order within eight weeks.

However, the respondents were granted liberty to initiate fresh disciplinary proceedings against the applicant in accordance with law.