Attempting to obtain undue advantage through subordinates for third parties constitutes an offence under Section 7 of the PC Act.

The Respondent No. 1, a Police Sub-Inspector, seized the Complainant’s vehicle and phone on accusations of illegal rice transportation

When the Complainant sought their return, a private person (Accused No. 3) allegedly demanded ₹50,000 on the Respondent’s behalf

On 01.06.2023, the Respondent allegedly told the Complainant to "do something to these boys" (subordinates) while directing a Constable (Accused No. 2) to release the vehicle

Accused No. 2 then demanded ₹5,000

Following a trap where a bribe was recovered from Accused No. 4, an FIR was registered

The High Court of Karnataka quashed the FIR on the grounds that there was no direct demand or acceptance by Respondent No. 1

The Court applied Section 7(a) of the PC Act (as amended in 2018), which criminalizes a public servant who "obtains, accepts, or attempts to obtain" undue advantage with the intent to perform public duty improperly

It emphasized Explanation 2 to Section 7, which clarifies that the advantage can be for "another person" and may be sought "directly or through a third party"

Regarding quashing, the Court relied on the "face value" principle from State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal and distinguished K. Shanthamma v. State of Telangana and Neeraj Dutta v. State (NCT of Delhi), noting they apply the "proof beyond reasonable doubt" standard post-trial, not at the FIR stage.

The Supreme Court observed that the High Court erred by sifting through evidence—such as the negative phenolphthalein test and departmental inquiry findings—matters strictly reserved for trial

On merits, the Court interpreted Section 7(a) expansively, noting that the 2018 amendment and Explanation 2 cover scenarios where a senior official orchestrates bribery for subordinates

The Respondent’s statement to "do something for those boys" followed by a subordinate’s specific monetary demand prima facie constituted an "attempt to obtain" an undue advantage for "another person"

The Court reasoned that requiring a direct, personal demand by the official would create a "perilous loophole" for senior officers to maintain deniability while directing corruption through intermediaries

The FIR and proceedings against Respondent No. 1 were revived and restored for trial

The Court clarified that its observations are restricted to the prima facie stage and should not influence the final determination of guilt at trial