Authority directed to consider notional appointment and seniority claims without prejudging their merits.

The applicants participated in the selection process for the post of Range Officer Grade-I in the J&K Forest Department pursuant to the Public Service Commission’s advertisement dated 15 March 2018.

After qualifying in the written and physical tests, they were included in the selection list dated 20 September 2019 on the basis of merit.

Their appointment was delayed because the selection list was challenged in O.A. No. 5540/2020, which was initially allowed on the ground of alleged non-compliance with the prescribed height requirement.

The applicants successfully challenged that decision before the High Court in W.P.(C) No. 1757/2021; the High Court allowed the writ petition on 6 September 2023, and the Supreme Court dismissed the opposing candidates’ SLP on 6 November 2023.

Thereafter, the applicants were appointed as Range Officer Grade-I by Government Order dated 4 October 2024.

The applicants claimed notional appointment and seniority from 25 November 2019, the date on which other candidates from the same selection process were appointed, together with consequential service benefits, though they did not seek monetary arrears for the intervening period.

During the hearing, they limited their prayer to treating the Original Application as a representation and directing the respondents to decide their claim in accordance with law, particularly in light of Sanjay Dhar v. J&K Public Service Commission.

Whether the applicants’ claim for notional appointment, seniority from 25 November 2019, and consequential service benefits should be considered by the respondents in light of their original merit position and the intervening litigation.

Whether the Original Application should be disposed of by directing the respondents to treat it as a representation and pass a reasoned order on the applicants’ claims.

The applicants relied upon Rule 24 of the J&K Classification, Control and Appeal Rules, under which inter se seniority is relevantly connected with the merit position of candidates selected through a selection process conducted by the Public Service Commission.

The Tribunal also considered the principle that a person should not suffer prejudice on account of an act of the court or litigation beyond that person’s control.

Reliance was placed on Sanjay Dhar v. J&K Public Service Commission, decided on 10 October 2000, for the proposition that a duly selected candidate who is wrongly denied appointment and subsequently succeeds in litigation may be entitled to appropriate consequential benefits, including appointment from the date on which the candidate ought to have been appointed, subject to law.

The Tribunal, however, directed that these principles be examined by the competent authority in accordance with the applicable rules and only to the extent relevant to the applicants’ case.

The Tribunal did not adjudicate the applicants’ substantive entitlement to retrospective appointment or seniority.

Since the applicants confined their request to consideration of their claim as a representation, and the respondents did not oppose disposal with appropriate directions, the Tribunal found that no useful purpose would be served by keeping the Original Application pending.

It accordingly directed the competent authority to examine the applicants’ original selection, merit position, subsequent appointment, the effect of the intervening litigation, the applicable service rules, and the principles referred to in Sanjay Dhar.

The Tribunal expressly preserved all questions of fact and law and left the merits of the claim open.

The respondents were directed to treat the Original Application as a representation and consider the applicants’ claims for notional appointment and seniority from 25 November 2019, along with consequential service benefits, the annexed documents, and the judgment in Sanjay Dhar, in accordance with the applicable rules and law.

The competent authority was directed to pass a detailed, reasoned, and speaking order within eight weeks from receipt of a certified copy of the Tribunal’s order.

All questions of fact and law were left open, and no order as to costs was made.