Availability of Revisional Remedy under Section 397 CrPC No Bar to Inherent Powers Under Section 482

The Appellants, Standard Chartered Bank and its officer, were prosecuted for allegedly contravening Sections 56(1) and 73(3) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (FERA) regarding unauthorized credits to a Vostro account in 1991-1992

The Enforcement Directorate filed complaints in May 2002 to meet the sunset period of the new FEMA legislation

The Appellants challenged the complaints and summoning orders before the Bombay High Court, which dismissed their petitions in March 2012, primarily on the ground that a quashing petition under Section 482 of the CrPC is not maintainable if an alternative remedy of Revision under Section 397 is available

Procedurally, the summons were not collected by the complainant for two years post-issuance, and the trial failed to commence for over two decades despite time-bound directions from the High Court

1. Whether the High Court was correct in holding that the availability of an alternative remedy of filing a revision under Section 397 of the CrPC operates as a bar to the maintainability of a petition under Section 482 of the CrPC?

2. Whether the non-compliance with the mandatory requirement of an "opportunity notice" under the proviso to Section 61(2) of FERA warrants quashing of the criminal complaints?

3. Whether the Appellants’ fundamental right to a speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution was violated due to the 30-year span since the alleged transaction?

The Court applied Section 482 and Section 397 of the CrPC, reiterating from Dhariwal Tobacco Products Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra and Prabhu Chawla v. State of Rajasthan that the inherent power of the High Court is not ousted by the availability of a revisional remedy

Regarding FERA, the Court interpreted the proviso to Section 61(2), which mandates that no complaint shall be made for acts done without permission unless the accused is given an "opportunity notice" to show such permission existed

This was supported by Devashis Bhattacharya v. Union of India, which held such notice must be a meaningful opportunity rooted in natural justice

Finally, the Court applied the "balancing test" for the right to a speedy trial under Article 21 as established in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak and Kailash Chandra Kapri v. State of UP, which protects against "suspended animation" caused by inordinate, unexplained prosecutorial delay

The Supreme Court found the High Court’s threshold rejection on maintainability legally flawed, noting that nomenclature is secondary to substantive justice and Section 482 can be invoked to prevent abuse of process even if a revision lies

On the merits of FERA, the Court observed that while the respondent claimed an opportunity notice was served, they failed to produce the document or specify its date throughout the proceedings, despite specific court orders to provide additional documents

Since the Magistrate took cognizance without satisfying the mandatory pre-condition of Section 61(2), the proceedings were held to be void

The Court identified that the delay was entirely attributable to the prosecution, which failed to collect summons for two years and ignored High Court mandates to conclude the trial within specific windows, thereby violating the Appellants' Article 21 rights

Compliance with the opportunity notice under Section 61(2) of FERA is a mandatory jurisdictional fact, and its absence renders cognizance invalid

The 23-year delay caused by prosecutorial negligence violated the right to a speedy trial

The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and set aside the High Court's judgment; Consequently, Criminal Case Nos. 1503-1504 of 2002 and the summoning orders were quashed