B.Ed. qualification was not a mandatory precondition where appointment terms and subsequent confirmation indicated otherwise.

Mrs. Savita Mohanty was appointed as an Assistant Teacher for teaching Oriya at Rajkumar College, Raipur, by appointment order dated 21 June 1990.

The appointment terms referred to acquisition of a B.Ed. qualification. Despite reminders, she did not obtain the qualification.

Her services were terminated on 19 June 2008, principally on the ground that the number of students opting for Oriya had become extremely low, and also referring to her failure to pursue the B.Ed. course.

The respondent challenged the termination under Section 58 of the M.P. Shops & Establishments Act, 1958. The Appellate Authority allowed the appeal on 8 May 2012 and directed reinstatement with full back wages and compound interest at 9% per annum.

The appellants challenged that order in W.P.(L) No. 134 of 2012, but the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on 17 March 2026.

The present intra-court appeal was filed under Section 2(1) of the Chhattisgarh High Court (Appeal to Division Bench) Act, 2006. The delay of 50 days in filing the appeal was condoned.

The respondent had been confirmed in service in 1994 and had received increments and other service benefits. The termination order did not state that her services were being terminated solely for want of a B.Ed. qualification.

Whether the respondent’s failure to acquire a B.Ed. qualification constituted a valid ground for terminating her services, having regard to the language of the appointment order and her subsequent confirmation in service?

Whether the termination was otherwise justified on the ground of the meagre number of students opting for Oriya, and whether the Appellate Authority’s order directing reinstatement warranted interference in writ appeal?

Whether the order of reinstatement with full back wages and compound interest at 9% per annum was liable to be set aside or modified?

The appeal was examined under Section 2(1) of the Chhattisgarh High Court (Appeal to Division Bench) Act, 2006, which permits an intra-court appeal against the order of a learned Single Judge.

The underlying service dispute arose under Section 58 of the M.P. Shops & Establishments Act, 1958, under which the respondent had challenged her termination.

The Court applied the principle that the terms of an appointment order must be construed in their proper context, and that a qualification requirement is not necessarily a mandatory pre-condition where the language of the appointment order does not clearly impose such a condition.

The Court also applied the limited standard of interference in an intra-court appeal, holding that interference is unwarranted absent perversity, jurisdictional error, or manifest illegality in the Single Judge’s decision.

The Court held that the termination order itself attributed the discontinuance principally to the extremely low strength of students studying Oriya and did not terminate the respondent solely for not obtaining a B.Ed. qualification.

The respondent’s confirmation in service in 1994, followed by the grant of increments and other service benefits, further demonstrated that the management had not treated the qualification as an absolute pre-condition to her continued employment.

Construing the word “until” in the appointment order in its context, the Court agreed that the B.Ed. requirement was not mandatory in the manner asserted by the appellants.

The Appellate Authority had considered the respondent’s confirmation and subsequent service benefits before setting aside the termination, and the Single Judge had correctly declined to interfere with that decision.

The appellants failed to establish perversity, jurisdictional error, or manifest illegality warranting appellate interference.

The Court also held that the respondent’s subsequent termination dated 10 May 2017, which she had not challenged, did not affect the legality of the order under consideration.

No ground was made out to interfere with the Single Judge’s order or the Appellate Authority’s direction for reinstatement with consequential benefits.

The writ appeal was dismissed, the order dated 17 March 2026 in W.P.(L) No. 134 of 2012 was affirmed, and there was no order as to costs.