Belated amendments lacking specific knowledge particulars and due diligence may be refused after trial begins.

The petitioners/defendants, tenants in the suit property, challenged the order dated 18 June 2024 passed by the Civil Judge (Junior Division), 2nd Court at Sealdah, in Ejectment Suit No. 118 of 2015.

The suit had been instituted by the opposite parties/plaintiffs principally on the ground of reasonable requirement.

After the plaintiffs’ evidence had concluded and the matter had been fixed for the defendants’ evidence, the defendants applied under Order VI Rule 17 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, seeking to amend their written statement.

The proposed amendment alleged that, during the pendency of the suit, the plaintiffs had obtained possession of a roadside shop room in the suit premises and had suppressed that fact, although the plaintiffs allegedly occupied six rooms in the premises.

The plaintiffs disputed actual possession of the shop room, contending that it remained tenanted, and argued that the amendment application was vague, belated, and unsupported by any stated date of possession or date of knowledge.

A Court-appointed Local Inspection Commissioner had inspected the property in the defendants’ presence but did not record that the plaintiffs were in possession of the roadside shop room.

The Trial Court rejected the amendment application, leading to the present revision.

During the revision, the Court also allowed CAN 1 of 2026 and expunged the name of opposite party no. 2, who had died on 23 February 2025.

The Court applied Order VI Rule 17 CPC, which governs amendment of pleadings, read with the inherent powers under Section 151 CPC.

The governing principle is that an amendment may be allowed where it is necessary for determining the real questions in controversy; however, a belated amendment must be supported by specific and credible facts, including an explanation for the delay and compliance with the due-diligence requirement.

The Court also recognised that deliberate concealment of material facts may justify allowing an amendment even at an advanced stage of proceedings, but held that the applicant must establish the factual basis and materiality of the proposed amendment.

The Court further relied on the evidentiary significance of the Local Inspection Commissioner’s report, which did not corroborate the defendants’ allegation of the plaintiffs’ possession.

The Court found that the defendants’ proposed amendment was made after the plaintiffs’ evidence had closed and at a stage when the defendants’ evidence was nearing completion.

Although the alleged possession of an additional shop room could theoretically be relevant to a claim based on reasonable requirement, the defendants failed to state the date on which the plaintiffs allegedly obtained possession or the date on which the defendants acquired knowledge of that fact.

This omission rendered the plea vague and weakened the assertion that the fact had genuinely been discovered at a later stage.

The Court also considered the Local Inspection Commissioner’s report, prepared following an inspection conducted in the defendants’ presence.

Since the report contained no reference to the plaintiffs’ possession of the roadside shop room, it materially undermined the factual foundation of the proposed amendment.

The municipal Certificate of Enlistment relied upon by the defendants established, at most, the issuance of the certificate in the plaintiffs’ name; it did not necessarily establish their actual possession.

In these circumstances, the proposed amendment was neither sufficiently precise nor adequately supported, and the Trial Court’s refusal to permit it disclosed no jurisdictional or legal error.

The Trial Court’s order dated 18 June 2024 was found to suffer from no illegality or material irregularity and was therefore not interfered with.

Accordingly, C.O. 394 of 2025 was dismissed.

CAN 1 of 2026 was allowed, and the name of deceased opposite party no. 2 was expunged from the revision.