Belated candidates cannot reopen a discontinued selection process or claim parity from individual litigation.

The applicants had applied in 2016 for various posts of Gramin Dak Sevak Mail Deliverer/Mail Carrier/Sub-Postmaster under the Tinsukia Postal Division pursuant to offline recruitment notifications. Their applications were submitted with requisite documents, but the selection and document-verification process was not completed before the Department of Posts issued Circular No. 17-23/2016-GDS dated 1 August 2016, directing discontinuance of the existing selection process and introduction of online recruitment.

A similarly situated candidate, Shri Debajit Patar, challenged the discontinuance of his selection process in O.A. No. 040/00359/2016. The Tribunal directed the respondents to complete consideration of his engagement, and the Gauhati High Court subsequently dismissed the respondents’ challenge and set aside the circular dated 1 August 2016 insofar as it related to Shri Patar. He was thereafter provisionally engaged as GDS Mail Deliverer/Mail Carrier, now designated ABPM, at Tirap B.O.

The applicants claimed parity with Shri Patar and sought finalisation of their 2016 selection processes and engagement against the concerned posts. The respondents opposed the claim on the grounds that the applicants had not challenged the discontinuance in 2016, the selection process had been discontinued long ago, subsequent online selections had substantially progressed, and Shri Patar’s relief was granted pursuant to his individual litigation.

The applicants approached the Tribunal only in 2024, approximately eight years after discontinuance of the original process.

Whether the applicants, who did not challenge the discontinuance of the 2016 offline GDS selection process at the relevant time, could seek its revival and finalisation in 2024?

Whether the applicants were entitled to claim parity with Shri Debajit Patar and obtain the benefit of the orders passed in his individual litigation?

Whether granting the applicants’ relief would impermissibly unsettle the subsequent online selection process and affect candidates already selected and appointed?

The Tribunal applied the principle that mere inclusion in a select list does not confer an indefeasible right to appointment, as established in Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India, (1991) 3 SCC 47.

It also relied on Tej Prakash Pathak & Ors. v. Rajasthan High Court & Ors., 2024 INSC 847, concerning the principle that the rules governing a selection process ordinarily cannot be altered to the prejudice of candidates after commencement of the process.

The Tribunal further applied the doctrines of delay, laches and acquiescence, holding that a candidate who remains silent for several years cannot ordinarily seek revival of a discontinued selection process after subsequent selections and appointments have taken place.

It distinguished the individual relief granted to Shri Debajit Patar as a judgment in personam, not a judgment in rem, and noted that the engagement of Gramin Dak Sevaks was governed by the Gramin Dak Sevaks (Conduct and Engagement) Rules, 2020.

The Tribunal held that although the applicants belonged to the same broad 2016 recruitment process as Shri Patar, they had not pursued any legal remedy when the process was discontinued. Shri Patar, in contrast, challenged the discontinuance in 2016 and continuously pursued his claim before the Tribunal and the High Court.

His engagement therefore resulted from the specific relief granted in his own proceedings and did not automatically extend to persons who had remained inactive.

The applicants’ claim was also weakened by the fact that the subsequent online recruitment process had substantially progressed and appointments had been made, with no posts kept vacant or reserved for them.

Applying the rule in Shankarsan Dash, the Tribunal found that the applicants had no enforceable or indefeasible right to appointment merely because they had participated in, or may have been considered under, the earlier process. Granting relief after eight years would unsettle the subsequent selection process and prejudice candidates already selected.

The Original Application was accordingly dismissed, and the Tribunal directed that there would be no order as to costs.